Judicial Case History Preservation Committee

The Judicial Case History Preservation Committee has compiled a list of significant cases by practice areas, from experts in each field. The list is presented below.

The Committee members are: Hon. John Lewis, Kaitlin M. O’Neil, Hon. Nancy Geiger and Gene Van Loan.

Attorneys who contributed to the list include: Noah A. Abrahams, William F. Ardinger, Elliott Berry, Gilles Bissonnette, Donna J. Brown, Stephen Buckley, Sherilyn Burnett Young, Doreen Connor, Bradford E. Cook, Thomas Donovan, Andrew Dunn, Dean B. Eggert, Andrew B. Eills, Bruce Felmly, Allison M. Fusco, John Burwell Garvey, Nancy Geiger, Susan S. Geiger, Wilbur Glahn, John M. Lewis, Michael S. Lewis, Theodore M. Lothstein, Amy Manzelli, Alison M. Minutell, Jay Niederman, Douglas Patch, Kathleen C. Peahl, Gordon Rehnborg, Alan Reische, John Ross, Richard Samuels, Albert Scherr, Greg Smith, James Q. Shirley, Gregory Sullivan, Jonathan Voegele, Andru Volinsky, Bob Wells, Jae Whitelaw.

We thank them for their contributions.

Subject
Administrative Law
Sub Subject
Date
1986
Case
Appeal of Monsieur Henri Wines, Ltd., 128 N.H. 191 (1986)
Summary
Holding that the Liquor Commission improperly applied its administrative rules in a manner that would have allowed it to ignore a comprehensive set of requirements and apply a standardless exception to them all whenever it chose to do so that would result in subjective findings. Such departures from the agency rules is not within the authority of an administrative agency and would be contrary to well establish administrative procedure. The Commission was obligated to apply its explicit set of regulatory standards adopted by rule.
Subject
Administrative Law
Sub Subject
Date
2000
Case
In re Londonderry Neighborhood Coal., 145 N.H. 201 (2000)
Summary
Holding that the State large Energy Facility Siting Committee did not impermissibly delegate its authority by incorporating approximately 500 conditions proposed by other State agencies into the permit ultimately issued by the Committee
Subject
Administrative Law
Sub Subject
On Rulemaking
Date
2000
Case
Asmussen v. Commissioner, Department of Safety, 145 N.H. 578 (2000)
Summary
In this case, the Court reaffirmed the demands of the N.H. Administrative Procedures Act in the space of administrative rule- making, and recognized the judicial branch as a venue for checking executive branch overreach. Chief Justice Brock authored the decision. The case involved a decision by the Department of Safety to change the procedures for administrative license hearings. The changed procedures were accomplished internally, without complying with the formal requirements imposed for rule making by the APA. The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that these changes constituted standards that required compliance with the APA, that the plaintiffs had standing as a matter of statutory law, and otherwise, to challenge the procedures and to obtain relief from the judicial branch, and that the trial court correctly issued declaratory relief to the plaintiffs in the matter. The case reaffirms New Hampshire's special restrictions on administrative rulemaking and adjudication, which demand greater public engagement and legislative involvement than what is required under the Federal APA.
Subject
Administrative Law
Sub Subject
On Interpretation and Deference
Date
2021
Case
Doe v. Commissioner, N.H. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 174 N.H. 239 (2021)
Summary
In this case, the question was whether the state was violating the rights of a plaintiff who was subject to an involuntary emergency admission to the New Hampshire Hospital. The decision is authored by Justice Hicks. The Court found that state arguments in favor of justifying detentions beyond the three day statutory period prescribed by the statute were without merit and that a plaintiff had been detained illegally. The Court rejected the state's claim that the Court must defer to its position on the matter, reminding the state that the courts are the final arbiters of the law in New Hampshire. The Court reaffirmed that administrative rules and practices may not expand the scope of statutes and, in fact, determined that the state's interpretation contravened the plain meaning of governing statutes. The Court also rejected the state's hidebound and opportunistic reliance on dictionary definitions that failed to acknowledge the overall statutory goals of the applicable provisions of law governing involuntary detentions and statutory due process. This was the second major decision by the New Hampshire Supreme Court to reject claims to administrative deference offered by the state in 2021. See also Genworth Life Ins. Co. v. N.H. Department of Ins., 2019-0727 (Feb. 17, 2021) (rejecting Insurance Commissioner's interpretation of statutes governing the setting of insurance rates).
Subject
Administrative Law
Sub Subject
On Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Date
2012
Case
Frost v. Commissioner, New Hampshire Banking Department, 163 N.H. 365 (2012)
Summary
In this case, the Court reaffirmed that the judicial branch is the proper forum for the resolution of subject matter jurisdiction challenges, where an administrative agency asserts that it has authority to regulate a private entity. Justice Conboy authored the majority decision. Justices Duggan and Lynn dissented. The Plaintiff alleged that his real estate development and holding company was not mortgage broker or bank. The Banking Department asserted otherwise and also asserted that the Banking Department should have jurisdiction to determine the Plaintiff's status under the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the question of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved first and that if the statute granting jurisdiction did not cover the Plaintiff there is no need for the Court to await the outcome of an administrative process, under the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. Justices Duggan and Lynn's dissent focused on the technical superiority of an administrative branch to answer questions, including about the nature of a given entity and whether it should be regulated or not. Both articulate a highly deferential perspective vis-à-vis administrative power which the NH Supreme Court refused to adopt.
Subject
Administrative Law
Sub Subject
On Governmental Abuse in Adjudication
Date
1977
Case
Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687 (1977)
Summary
In this case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court placed outside boundaries on the bad faith litigation of state enforcement officials who engage in obstinate and unjust litigation against citizens seeing relief before administrative bodies. The decision is by Justice Douglas and it was provided with regard to an unemployment benefits case. Justice Douglas noted that this environment is one where individuals are without means and so unlikely to be able to defend their interests as effectively against the administrative state. In memorable language directed at the state unemployment bureaucracy, he wrote: Its obdurate pursuit of further fruitless litigation showed a callous disregard for the rights of the plaintiff, and resulted in a needless drain upon the resources of the judicial system of this state. The award of attorney's fees against the defendant department in the instant case was proper. The case is cited, even well beyond the administrative law context, to this day.
Subject
Administrative Law
Sub Subject
On Rulemaking
Date
1981
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552 (1981)
Summary
The legislature sought the Court's advice as to whether administrative rules presented to a joint committee of both houses of the legislature violated the separation of powers, including state constitutional non delegation doctrine principles. The Court, in an advisory opinion, concluded that the scheme was unconstitutional because it vested the legislative will in a small subgroup of the legislature in violation of the bicameral schema of the state constitution. The Court indicated, however, that with substantial changes, including the submission of rules, ultimately, to the entire the legislature, the APA rulemaking process would pass constitutional muster. The decision reaffirms the important structural differences and imperatives of each branch of the government as a matter of formal constitutional law.
Subject
Administrative Law
Sub Subject
On Penalties and Juries
Date
2019
Case
Ridlon v. N.H. Bureau of Securities Regulation, 172 N.H. 417 (2019)
Summary
In this case, the Court permitted the Bureau of Securities Regulation to pursue millions in administrative fines against a private entity, notwithstanding the entities' claim that such an action should be subject to his right to trial by jury. Chief Justice Lynn authored the decision. Justices Hantz Marconi and Donovan dissented. In the case, the Bureau of Securities Regulation, an enforcement arm of the N.H. Secretary of State, sought administrative fines against an investment advisor, arising from the claim that he improperly charged clients. The advisor alleged that such an action triggered his rights to a jury trial under Part I, Article 20 of the New Hampshire Constitution. The right is described as sacred in our state constitution. The N.H. Supreme Court reiterated the fundamental nature of the right but ruled that the statutory design constituted a legislative choice to promote ease and efficiency over constitutional formality. The decision spends a significant amount of time distinguishing prior case law. Perhaps it is most noteworthy for its dissent, in which the dissenting justices all but invite a stare decisis challenge to the decision, at least, while providing a rigorous review and underscoring the importance of the function of the jury under our state constitution.
Subject
Administrative Law
Sub Subject
On Standing
Date
2017
Case
State v. Actavis, 170 N.H. 211 (2017)
Summary
In this case, the Court assessed the status of private counsel to stand in the shoes of state enforcement actors and to pursue administrative subpoenas against private parties. The case arose from an enforcement action brought by the New Hampshire Department of Justice against pharmaceutical manufacturers engaged in the business of selling opioids. New Hampshire suffered through what has been called an opioids crisis and the New Hampshire Department of Justice retained private counsel on a contingency fee basis to pursue an administrative action against pharmaceutical manufacturers. The defendants alleged that NH DOJ failed to comply with the formalities of law when retaining counsel, including requirements that the contracts at issue be presented to, and approved by, the Executive Council. Since the administrative subpoenas came from improperly and illegally retained counsel, they were ultra vires and so void. Judge Nicolosi also agreed that this illegality injured the manufacturers and so gave rise to standing. The primary advocate at the trial court level was Gordon MacDonald, who became the Attorney General a few months later, and is now the state's chief justice. Judge Nicolosi agreed with him at the trial court level. With MacDonald at the head of NH DOJ, the task of defending the decision fell to Bill Glahn, of the McLane firm. Yet, the Court reversed, concluding that the defendants did not have cognizable standing, even as the targets of the administrative subpoenas, subject to the costs of complying with them.
Subject
Constitutional Law
Sub Subject
Date
1983
Case
State v. LaFrance, 124 N.H. 171 (1983)
Summary
Holding that a statute permitting law enforcement officials to wear firearms in the courtroom was unconstitutional under the doctrine of separation of powers because control of courtroom is necessary incident to judicial power and as such is protected from encroachment by the Legislature. This was a case of first impression when it arose.
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Date
1996
Case
Barrows v Boles, 141 NH 382 (1996)
Summary
Rascality test under RSA 358-A N.H. RSA § 358-A:2 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state. Although N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2 is broadly worded, not all conduct in the course of trade or commerce falls within its protection. An ordinary breach of contract claim does not constitute conduct actionable under the Consumer Protection Act. After observing that it is impossible to establish a fixed definition of unfair or deceptive acts, the Supreme Court recognized a commonly accepted test for determining whether conduct is unfair or deceptive. This test is that the objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce. In the absence of proof of this level of unfair or deceptive conduct, a claim under RSA 358- A:2 may not be maintained.
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Foreign Judgment/Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Date
1987
Case
Gettler-Ryan, Inc. v. Kashulines, 130 N.H. 15 (1987)
Summary

Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Periodic Payment Petitions
Date
2002
Case
American Express v. Moskoff, 148 N.H. 446 (2002)
Summary
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Date
1995
Case
Cheshire Medical Center v Holbrook, 140 N.H. 187 (1995)
Summary
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Shifting of Legal Fees
Date
1996
Case
Fleet Bank v. Christy's Table, 141 N.H. 285 (1996)
Summary
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Statute of Limitations
Date
1978
Case
General Theraphysical v. Dupuis, 118 N.H. 277 (1978)
Summary
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Foreclosure
Date
1985
Case
Murphy v. Financial Development Corp., 126 N.H. 536 (1985)
Summary
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Mechanics Liens
Date
1979
Case
Westinghouse v. Electromesh, 119 N.H. 833 (1979)
Summary
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Date
1985
Case
Murphy v. Financial Development Corp., 126 N.H. 536 (1985)
Summary
Duty of lender to proceed in prudent manner when foreclosing upon the borrower's real estate. A mortgagee/bank foreclosing pursuant to the statutory power of sale is bound both by the statutory requirements and by a duty to protect the interests of the mortgagor through the exercise of good faith and due diligence. At the foreclosure auction, the lender purchased the property for $27,000, the balance owed them. Within a few hours, the lenders sold the property to third party (who had not attended the auction) for $38,000, an amount much greater than it had bid at the auction.

In the trial court, the master denied the lenders' motion to dismiss and found that the lenders had failed to exercise good faith and due diligence, assessing damages against them equal to the difference between the property's fair market value and the price obtained at the sale. On appeal, the court held that denial of the motion to dismiss was proper because RSA 479:25. II only barred an action challenging a foreclosure based on facts the mortgagor knew or should have known soon enough to permit filing a petition to enjoin the action prior to the sale. Here, the action was based on events at or after the sale. The court found insufficient evidence to support the master's finding of bad faith, but did find a lack of due diligence in obtaining a fair price. With this holding, the Supreme Court recognized a fiduciary duty which imposed upon the bank the obligation to obtain a fair and reasonable price under the circumstances, even if this meant postponing the auction. The court affirmed the master's conclusion that the lenders failed to obtain a fair price at the foreclosure sale, but disagreed with the master's finding of bad faith, finding only a lack of due diligence instead.
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Date
2009
Case
Livingston v 18 Mile Point Drive, Ltd., 158 N.H. 619 (2009)
Summary
Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In every agreement, there is an implied covenant that the parties will act in good faith and fairly with one another. In New Hampshire, there is not merely one rule of implied goodfaith duty, but a series of doctrines, each of which serves different functions. The various implied good-faith obligations fall into three general categories: (1) contract formation; (2) termination of at-will employment agreements; and (3) limitation of discretion in contractual performance. While the third category is comparatively narrow, its broader function is to prohibit behavior inconsistent with the parties' agreed-upon common purpose and justified expectations, as well as with common standards of decency, fairness and reasonableness.
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Date
1984
Case
Lash v Cheshire Savings Bank, 124 N.H. 435 (1984)
Summary
Fiduciary relationship of bank to depositor under defined circumstances. A fiduciary relationship existed wherever influence had been acquired and abused or confidence had been reposed and betrayed. Lash owed a debt to a third party, and the third party arranged for Lash to obtain a loan from the bank. Subsequently, a large portion of Lash's loan proceeds were never received by Lash, but was unilaterally credited by the bank to the third party's account to reduce the third party's debt. Lash sued the bank for breach of the loan contract and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that the bank's disbursement to the third party's account was not authorized by them. The debtors also claimed that the bank's action caused them emotional distress. The jury found in favor of the debtors on their breach of fiduciary claim and their claim for mental suffering damages. The court affirmed as to the breach of fiduciary claim. A fiduciary relationship existed wherever influence had been acquired and abused or confidence had been reposed and betrayed. In doubtful cases, whether a fiduciary relationship existed was a question for a trier of fact. Bank officers were held to a high level of conduct. Therefore, the jury's finding that a fiduciary relationship existed was reasonable. The court reversed the grant of damages for mental suffering, as such damages were not allowed in actions on a contract.
Subject
Consumer Law
Sub Subject
Spouse Liabilty for Necessities
Date
1996
Case
St. Joseph Hospital v Rizzo, 141 N.H. 9 (1996)
Summary
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Officers - Express Authority
Date
1987
Case
Daniel Webster Council v. St. James Ass'n, 129 N.H. 681 (1987)
Summary
The Supreme Court held that a corporation's officers have only those power conferred on them by statute, the Articles of Incorporation, the bylaws of the corporation, or resolutions of the directors.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
1989
Case
Kennedy v. Titcomb, 131 N.H.399 (1989)
Summary
The Court outlined the then elements of the tort of corporate freeze-out, but did not adopt the cause of action. This remains the status of the law, although it has been extensively developed in Massachusetts and Massachusetts law has been relied on by the Superior Court Business Docket in New Hampshire.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
1991
Case
Davey V. Unitil Corp., 133 NH 833 (1991)
Summary
The Court tackled the requirement that a shareholder assert a proper purpose in connection with a request to inspect and copy corporate records, in this case the list of shareholders names and addresses. Davey, a Unitil shareholder, demanded the right to inspect and make excerpts from the Unitil shareholder list under the State Business Corporation Act, asserting as the required proper purpose his intention to give the list to another company, EUA, that had made a tender offer for Unitil shares, so that EUA could communicate directly with Unitil's shareholders with respect to its tender offer, consistent with Davey's objective of selling his shares if the tender offer was successful. Unitil refused the demand, and the trial court held that seeking the list to turn it over to EUA was not a proper purpose. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Davey had an independent, proper interest and that his means of achieving his objective, giving the list to EUA rather than communicating with other shareholders himself, was not the correct focus.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
1989
Case
Kennedy v. Titcomb, 131 NH 399 (1989)
Summary
In which a plaintiff minority shareholder of a New Hampshire corporation sought to require another shareholder, who had purchased shares from three other shareholders, thereby acquiring majority control, to purchase the plaintiff's shares at the same price per share. The Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action, citing case law from other jurisdictions to the effect that a shareholder has no duty to pay other holders equally in amassing voting control.and in fact no duty at all to offer to purchase any particular minority holders shares. The Court distinguished the case from the close corporation equal opportunity rule of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, on the basis of Titcomb being a shareholder purchaser, in contrast to a corporate repurchase.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
2013
Case
Axenics v. Turner Construction Company 164 N.H. 659 (2013)
Summary
Court held that a party cannot recover under a theory of unjust enrichment when there is a valid, express contract covering the subject matter at hand.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
2002
Case
Baker Valley Lumber, Inc. v. Ingersoll Rand, 148 N.H. 609 (2002)
Summary
The Court applied the standard for admissibility of expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
1990
Case
Centronics v. Genicom, 132 N.H. 133 (1989)
Summary
The Court surveyed the law on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contracts that had been developed by the Court in Griswold v. Heat Corporation, 108 N.H. 119 (1967) (contract obligation dependent on the reasonable expectation of the parties and where discretion remains, it must be exercised in good faith) and Seaward Construction Co. v. City of Rochester, 118 N.H. 128, (1978) (a party could not frustrate contract performance by failing to act where discretion granted). In Centronics the Court clarified that where the parties have removed discretion by specified terms in the contract, the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing does not apply. Put differently, the parties to a contract have no obligation to act in good faith contrary to the express terms of the contract.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
2005
Case
Durham v. Durham, 151 N.H. 757 (2005)
Summary
The Court eliminated the distinction between derivative and direct actions for shareholders in closely held corporations where all of the parties are involved in the litigation.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
2016
Case
Finn v. Ballentine Partners, 169 N.H. 128 (2016)
Summary
The Court reaffirmed the right to review arbitration awards under RSA chapter 542 for plain mistake of law. But the primary significance of the ruling is its holding that the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act on confirming and vacating arbitration awards, 9 U.S.C. §§10, 11, do not preempt New Hampshire state rules in that regard where an action to confirm or vacate an award is filed in state court because the FAA preempts only those state laws that discriminatorily invalidate an arbitration agreement. The Court opined that no federal policy requires that arbitration be governed by a single set of procedural rules as set out in the FAA, in all circumstances; rather, the Court said, federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
1992
Case
Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270 (1992)
Summary
Lost profit damages for breach of contract may be awarded only where they were foreseeable in that they resulted in the ordinary course of events from the violation of the contract and the defendant had reason to know the relevant facts and to foresee that the loss would occur. Also, Petrie-Clemons v. Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120 (1982).
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
1985
Case
Hyrdraform Products v. American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 127 N.H. 187 (1985)
Summary
Limitation of damages clauses in contracts do not violate the unconscionability provision of Article 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, RSA 382-A:2-302. The case is better known, however, for its holding that although lost profits are recoverable as consequential damages, they may not be recovered in addition to the value of the business as a going concern.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
2012
Case
Lawrence v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 164 N.H. 93 (2012)
Summary
The Court addressed the requirements of class actions under the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, RSA chapter 358- A, and decertified one of the largest classes certified in New Hampshire by finding that individual claims predominated.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
1974
Case
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130 (1974)
Summary
(termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract), Howard v. Dorr Woolen Company, 120 N.H. 295 (1980) (same), Cloutier v. A.&P. Tea Co., Inc., 121 N.H. 915,436 A.2d 1140 (1981) (two-part test for termination of at will employees requires a showing by plaintiff that the defendant was motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation in terminating the plaintiff's employment, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that he was discharged because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do something that public policy would condemn).
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
1970
Case
Peter Salvucci & Sons v. State, 110 N.H. 136 (1970)
Summary
Determination of damages for breach of a contract is an inexact science and the sum reached by whatever method used will often be no more than an approximation. The law does not require mathematical certainty. Also, Independent Mechanical Contractors v. Burke & Sons, 138 N.H. 110 (1993) (Uncertainty is inherent in any projection of future profits, the essential issue is whether the evidence on lost profits provides enough information under the circumstances to permit the fact finder to reach a reasonably certain determination of the amount of gains prevented.)
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
1989
Case
Palmerv. U.S. Savings Bank of America, 131 N.H. 433 (1989)
Summary
The Court addressed the standing of parties to be derivative representatives and held that parties with direct claims against a corporation for damages may not also serve as derivative representatives.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
The State as Commercial Actor
Date
2014
Case
XTL-NH, Inc. v. N.H. State Liquor Comm'n, 2014 N.H. Super. LEXIS 9 (July 16, 2014)
Summary
Judge Richard McNamara requires some mention here, as the first appointment to oversee the Business and Commercial Dispute Docket in New Hampshire. The Business and Commercial Dispute Docket is a specially designed docket meant to facilitate a more sophisticated procedural environment before which commercial disputes may be resolved between parties, should they consent to the docket's jurisdiction. As its first justice, Judge McNamara established and maintained an important repository of his decisions in the area of commercial law through the state judiciaries website. This case, as described in an order which is available through the same website, involved a lawsuit between the New Hampshire Secretary of State and one of its contractor. Judge McNamara denied summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds noting that the state consented to be sued for breach of contract claims by statute.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Date
2003
Case
Bielagus V. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 149 N.H. 635 (2003)
Summary
The Court for the first time articulated the standard for successor liability in commercial contract cases. The defendant had purchased all of the assets of a division of a corporation against which the plaintiff had an existing judgment for the amount unpaid on the selling corporation's promissory note. The defendant continued to operate the purchased division's business, having also continued to employ the employees of the sold division. The purchaser expressly did not assume the seller's liabilities other than certain trade liabilities. In the course of upholding the trial court's denial of successor liability, the Supreme Court expressly adopted application of the four common theories of successor liability (express or implied assumption, defacto merger, mere continuation, and fraud/evasion as sole purpose). In addition, the Court rejected the substantial continuity standard applied by federal and a minority of state courts.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Economic Loss Doctrine
Date
2007
Case
Plourde Sand & Gravel Co. v. JG/ Eastern, Inc., 154 N.H. 791 (2007)
Summary
The Supreme Court held that the economic loss rule preclude[s] contracting parties from pursuing tort recovery for purely economic or commercial losses associated with the contract relationship.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Transfer of Corporate Interest
Date
2011
Case
N.H. Resident L.P. of the Lyme Timber c'o. v. N.H. Dep't of Revenue Admin., 162 N.H. 98 (2011)
Summary
The issue posed was whether for purposes of the Business Profits Tax an interest in an entity was 'transferable'. While the ability to exercise the right of first refusal might in some circumstances allow the partnership to block a transfer of partnership shares to a person the partnership found undesirable, this was not the equivalent of an approval as contemplated by the DRA regulations because it did not represent a significant restraint on the ability to alienate partnership interests. Because in order to block transfer to an outsider, the partnership had to be prepared to pay the disposing interest-holder the same consideration offered by the outsider, the right of first refusal did not significantly affect the marketability or value of a limited partner's economic interest. Next, the DRA was not estopped from collecting the taxes. Petitioners did not claim that the DRA ever took any affirmative steps that might be viewed as a representation that a limited partnership's treatment of interest and dividends income as taxable to the partnership was proper.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
By-Laws
Date
1982
Case
McCool v. N.H. Electric Coop., Inc., 122 N.H. 113 (1982)
Summary
By-laws may include any provision for the regulation and management for the affairs of the corporation, as long as the provision is not inconsistent with the law or the Articles of Incorporation. See, NHRSA 293- A: [insert specific statutory reference].
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Books and Records
Date
1991
Case
Davey v. Unitil Corp., 133 N.H. 833 (1991)
Summary
For purposes of access to certain corporate records upon written demand of stockholders who have a proper purpose for making a demand, the Supreme Court held that proper purpose is broad and includes a shareholder who intends to deliver the records to a non-shareholder who intended to use it to forward its tender offer for shares of the corporation.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Date
1989
Case
Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 132 N.H. 133 (1989)
Summary
The Supreme Court held that under an agreement that appears to invest one party with a degree of discretion in performance sufficient to deprive another party of a substantial proportion of the agreement's value, the parties' intent to be bound by an enforceable contract raises an implied obligation of good faith to observe the reasonable limits in exercising that discretion. Justice Souter presented an in depth analysis of the varying circumstances in which the implied duty might arise.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Successor Liability - De Facto Merger
Date
2015
Case
Celestica, LLC v. Commc'ns Acquisitions Corp., 168 N.H. 276 (2015)
Summary
The doctrine of 'de facto merger' would in some circumstances render a successor entity automatically liable for the debts and obligations of a predecessor entity. Again, the determination will depend in many cases on the specific facts at hand. The Supreme Court held that when defendant purchased the assets of the seller corporation, which owed a judgment debt to plaintiff, this did not amount to a de facto merger between the two companies for purposes of successor liability, as the trial court found that defendant replaced virtually the entire management team of the seller corporation, altered control of the board of directors, replaced half of its employees, and changed its business model, that the smallest institutional shareholder of the seller corporation became the majority shareholder of defendant, that although the seller corporation ceased its ordinary business operations, this factor was entitled to little weight, that the assumption of only critical business liabilities was not a factor weighing in favor of finding successor liability, and that the asset sale was bona fide.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Foreign Partnerships (RSA 305- A)
Date
1974
Case
Burnham & Co. v. Kleinhans, 114 N.H. 472 (1974)
Summary
The quantum of activity constituting doing business under RSA ch. 305-A (Supp. 1973) requiring the registration of foreign partnerships doing business in the State is greater than that required to subject a foreign corporation to jurisdiction in New Hampshire and includes a showing of some wholly intrastat.e transactions.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Shareholder Rights - Future Payment
Date
1978
Case
Bielinski v. Miller, 118 N.H. 26 (1978)
Summary
The Supreme Court held that in a close corporation a subscriber who had not yet paid for his stock was still entitled to the rights and privileges of a stockholder. The Court also found that an agreement to subscribe to a corporation's stock need not be in any particular form or even in writing.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Successor Liability
Date
2003
Case
Bielagus v. EMRE of N.H. Corp., 149 N.H. 635 (2003)
Summary
The doctrine of 'de facto merger' would in some circumstances render a successor entity automatically liable for the debts and obligations of a predecessor entity. The determination will depend in many cases on the specific facts at hand. The Supreme Court held that there was no de facto merger where the sale was in the nature of an asset purchase agreement and not a continuation of the predecessor's business operations even where the predecessor remained a viable operation in the commercial real estate business. Nor did the mere continuation exception apply because three distinct entities remained after the sale, thereby precluding successor liability. The court found that the expanded continuity of enterprise exception should not have been applied and was not the law of New Hampshire, but concluded that the trial court's factual findings dictated the same result under the applicable mere continuation theory.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Successor Liability
Date
1988
Case
Simoneau v. 5. Bend Lathe, 130 N.H. 466, 466, 543 A.2d 407,407 (1988)
Summary
The doctrine of strict liability will in some circumstances render a defendant absolutely liable for injuries arising from the operation of its product, without the necessity for establishing traditional predicates for negligence. The underlying case was a claim filed by plaintiff punch press operator for recovery under a theory of strict liability against defendant punch press manufacturer. Plaintiff's injuries were allegedly caused by a machine manufactured in 1948 by a predecessor manufacturer. The court held that the spreading of the risk theory provided no justification for imposing strict liability on a corporate defendant. The court found that strict liability was not a no-fault system of compensation. The court held that proof of a manufacturer's responsibility remained an essential element of a strict liability claim under New Hampshire law. The court also held that the manufacturer who placed the item into the stream of commerce was the one held to be responsible for the finished product. Accordingly, the court answered the certified question of the federal district court in the negative, stating that New Hampshire law did not encompass the product-line theory of successor liability.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Veil Piercing
Date
1991
Case
Terren v. Butler, 134 N.H. 635 (1991)
Summary
In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the circumstances under which a company's distribution of assets after a claim had been brought against it permitted piercing of the corporate veil. The individual defendants were the sole officers and shareholders of the corporations. The officers disregarded some corporate formalities, such as never having paid stated consideration for their shares in the corporation, while complying with others. In most relevant part, the corporation continued to distribute its assets at a time when several claims had been made against it. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling holding the officers personally liable for corporate obligations.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
The Uniform Commerical Code Takes Hold
Date
1977
Case
Werner v. Montana, 117 N.H. 721 (1977)
Summary
In the twenty years after the introduction of the Uniform Commercial Code, New Hampshire, like all states an adopter of the UCC, began to vet disputes according to its provisions through the judicial branch. The Uniform Commercial Code governs transactions involving the sale of goods. In terms of contract commitments, it codifies the term warranty and imposes warranties as a matter of the express statements or conduct of the parties, or as a matter of implication (i.e. implied warranties). This case is a prominent example of an earlier dispute in which the Court gave further definition to the code. It involved the sale of a boat and the interpretation of specialized language common to the industry of boat selling (make up and water tight). The Court found for the plaintiff, concluding, among other things, that the use of this language bound the seller to the express terms of the warranty and that the terms implied commitments that included the commitment that the boat would not leak. One of the attorneys on the case, Daniel Cappiello, went on to serve as a district court judge in Rochester for many years. This is one of the many cases by which the UCC was launched in NH (puns intended).
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
The Expectation Measure of Damages
Date
2019
Case
ProDone v. Basham, 172 N.H. 138 (2019)
Summary
New Hampshire Supreme Court finds that consequential damages, including the award of attorney's fees and costs, arises from the breach of a covenant not to sue. The case presents a clear-eyed view of contracts generally, that contracts may be formed across subject-matter domains, including to agreements between parties not to pursue further action. The case also reaffirms that the expectation measure as the default measure of damages and is expansive with regard to what is part of the damages calculation. In this case, the consequence of suing in violation of a covenant not to sue undermined the party's expectation that it would not have to pay attorney's fees to defend, a core component of a true expectation calculation. The case disagreed with a 1966 decision by Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit, to the contrary, signaling, once again, NH independence. Prominent law firms on each side of the case: Shaheen and Gordon on the losing side. Rath Young on the winning side. Decision was mentioned by Corbin on Contracts as the better reasoned decision.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
The Consumer Protection Act
Date
2001
Case
Milford Lumber Co, Inc. v. RCB Realty, Inc., 147 N.H. 15 (2001)
Summary
Frequently cited case interpreting New Hampshire Consumer Protect Act (CPA). The New Hampshire Supreme Court applies the Consumer Protection Act broadly to include any unfair and deceptive business practice, including in the case, the business practice of entering a contract in which the buyer agrees to accept goods knowing that the buyer will not pay after receiving the goods. The case drew a rare dissent from Justice Duggan, who would have interpreted the CPA to apply only to sellers based on his construction of the statutory language. Generally, the case is cited to support a broad reading of the CPA and it is cited frequently by litigants and courts.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Breach
Date
2012
Case
Ellis v. Candia and Snow Equipment, Inc., 164 N.H. 457 (2012)
Summary
The case involved the sale of a truck parts business. The sale proceeded by multiple separate documents, including documents conveying assets, inventory, and intellectual property/good will. The trial court treated each document as a separate contract. The New Hampshire Supreme Court viewed each as part of one transaction and concluded that the trial court's decision, which included an order rescinding one of the agreements, was in error. As a matter of doctrine, the parties asked, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court clarified, that on remand, the question of breach turned on whether any violation of any contract was material. That question turned on whether the breach went to the root or essence of the contract. This question, in turn and according to the Court, is a question for the trier of fact to resolve. The case does not appear to raise the specter of the Uniform Commercial Code, which imposes a different test: The Perfect Tender Rule. This is true despite the fact that an important part of the transaction involved the conveyance of goods and the UCC is not limited to typical retail transactions by its terms.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
The Duty to Mitigate
Date
1963
Case
Coos Lumber Co. v. Builder Lumber & Supply Co., 104 N.H. 404 (1963)
Summary
New Hampshire Supreme Court reiterates the duty to mitigate as essential to the quantum of damages in a breach of contract case. The case involves logs. More specifically, it's a case about a contract where one party promised to sell logs to another. The trial court instructed the jury that the measure of damages is equivalent to what the prevailing party would have realized had the breaching party performed. The trial court did not instruct the jury about the duty to mitigate. The failure to do so resulted in reversible error on the damages issue along, and remand for a retrial on damages. The case reinforces that even the victim of a breach must not engage in economically harmful conduct (as defined in a classic sense as between the parties alone, without reference to larger questions regarding environmental degradation and other externalities) by failing to engage in reasonable efforts to resell.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Public Policy Limitations and Non Competes
Date
1997
Case
Concord Orthopaedics PA v. H. James Forbes, 142 N.H. 440 (1997)
Summary
New Hampshire Supreme Court places limitations on the enforceability of covenants not to compete in a lawsuit between a prominent medical practice and a physician. The case proclaims: The public policy of New Hampshire encourages free trade and discourages covenants not to compete. As a matter of policy, it therefore limits the enforceability of contracts between employers and employees (at least) through a rule of reasonableness that demands narrow tailoring to meet the ends of restricting the appropriation of the employer's assets. As a matter of policy, it also imposes geographic and temporal limitations on the enforceability of such covenants as central elements of the rule of reasonableness test courts must and will apply going forward. Prominent attorneys Martha Gordon and Russ Hilliard argued the cases before the court.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Implied Good Faith
Date
1989
Case
Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 132 N.H. 133 (1989)
Summary
The New Hampshire Supreme Court gives greater, exhaustive treatment to the implied obligation of good faith in commercial contracts. Chief Justice Lynn described the case to my first-year contracts class at UNH· Law, this semester, as exerting substantial influence on the court's commercial law jurisprudence, and so it is included, here. The case involves a negotiated, sophisticated business asset purchase agreement between two businesses represented, in litigation, by two top commercial litigators in the state at the time, Andrew Dunn from Devine Millimet and Bill Glahn from Mclane. Dunn, for the plaintiff, alleged that the defendant failed to release escrow funds plaintiff claimed no party could dispute defendant owed. Dunn argued that the duty of good faith demanded release. Glahn argued that this interpretation constituted an effort to rewrite the contract. Justice Souter agreed with Glahn, interpreting the contract to require that money remain in escrow until the parties resolved any disputes among and between them regarding the value of the transaction. Justice Souter did not see Glahn's client as acting in violation of the duty of good faith.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Formation
Date
2008
Case
Bel Air Associates v. New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, 158 N.H. 104 (2008)
Summary
The New Hampshire Supreme Court engages in substantial discussion of contract formation under New Hampshire law. The case is cited as an authority across doctrines within Daniel J. Pope's 2018-2019 edition of New Hampshire Civil Jury Instructions. The case involved a dispute between a state-licensed nursing home and DHHS. The trial court concluded that the document Bel Air relied upon was not a contract and did not bind DHHS to any obligations. The New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that forms of acceptance need not be made through the formalities of writing and a contract may be formed through acceptance by course of conduct. The Court commented that a contract need not be the product of what it calls a paradigm of draftsmanship. Instead, any question of contract formation turns on whether the contractual arrangement, as a whole, was reasonably clear. The case stands for the proposition that contracts may be formed without formality and that contract formation is a question of fact to be resolved by a fact-finder. The standard is consistent with the Uniform Commercial Code's pro-formation policies, which permit acceptance by a wide spectrum of means, written or otherwise.
Subject
Corporate & Commercial Law
Sub Subject
Economic Loss Doctrine
Date
2011
Case
Wyle v. Lees, 162 N.H. 406 (2011)
Summary
The Supreme Court held that the economic loss doctrine did not bar recovery where the defendants' misrepresentations had induced the plaintiff to sign a contract that caused economic loss.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1997
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 141 N.H. 562 (1997)
Summary
The separation-of powers doctrine in the State constitution empowers only the Court to make court rules. When the legislature legislates an over-ride of Rule 404(b) of the New Hampshire Rules of Evidence, it is a constitutional violation of that doctrine.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1995
Case
State v. Chagnon, 139 N.H. 671, 662 (1995).
Summary
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
2007, 2009
Case
State v. Sharkey, 155 N.H. 638 (2007) ; State v. Thompson, 161 N.H. 507 (2011); State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762 (2009)
Summary
These three decisions, decided over the course of just four years, have substantially heightened the expectations for what constitutes effective assistance of counsel in a criminal case. In Sharkey , a conviction was reversed because the defense lawyer misadvised his client as to the collateral consequences of his conviction. In Thompson, the defense lawyer was held ineffective on direct appeal for failure to object to hearsay testimony that resulted in his client's conviction; in other words, the conviction was reversed without a post-trial hearing where the defense lawyer could attempt to justify his conduct. In Whittaker , the defense lawyer was held ineffective for not retaining an expert witness to help him combat the prosecution's expert witness.

Each of these issues centers around a core aspect of defense lawyer's role: determining the potential consequences of client's criminal conduct, skillfully and aggressively enforcing the rules of evidence during trial, and investigating a case and preparing a defense. But to this writer's knowledge, each of these decisions was a first of its kind in our State. Together, they substantially raise the bar for what a lawyer must do to provide effective representation in a criminal case. And in doing so, these and other decisions discourage dabblers in civil practice from occasionally handling a criminal case because of the amount of specialized knowledge now required to provide effective representation.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1951
Case
State v. Mara, 96 N.H. 463 (1951)
Summary
In Mara , the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution. Part I, Article 19 is the State's equivalent of the Fourth Amendment. It was adopted prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment into the federal constitution. Neither Constitution expressly sets forth a remedy for violation of the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The United States Supreme Court had adopted the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment from evidence in a criminal case in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) . But the exclusionary rule had not yet been incorporated against the States, meaning that States were not required to recognize and apply the rule in criminal prosecutions in state courts.

The decision's author, one of our most revered jurists (Justice Kenison) explained the ruling as follows: In this State it has been the consistent practice for a century to admit relevant evidence in criminal cases although secured illegally. Although the federal rule excluding such evidence has been in effect only since 1914, it has never been followed or approved in this State.

Just 10 years later, the United States Supreme Court incorporated the exclusionary rule against the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) , requiring all States to enforce the exclusionary rule and rendering the Mara decision moot for practical purposes.

But Mara is much more than a mere footnote to the history of criminal procedure in our State. We are now accustomed to thinking that our State Constitution is interpreted independently of the federal constitution, and that Part I, Article 19 provides at least as much protection as the Fourth Amendment, and in many instances, more protection. The Mara case is a reminder that while we have always held the belief that the State Constitution should be interpreted independently, there was a time in our history when independent meant less rights for our citizens when prosecuted in state court rather than federal court, not more.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1993
Case
State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402 (1993); State v. Drewry, 139 N.H. 678 (1995)
Summary
In this landmark decision, which reversed convictions for aggravated felonious sexual assault against a child, the Court held that the trial court should not have allowed prosecution testimony of an expert psychologist that the child victims exhibited symptoms consistent with those of a sexually abused child. The Court very closely scrutinized the scientific and social science underpinnings of the psychologist's testimony and ultimately held that it did not rise to the level of reliability required by Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence. While the Court did not say that expert testimony must meet a higher threshold of reliability for criminal cases as opposed to civil cases, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the issue arose in the solemn matter of a criminal trial.

The Court decided Cressey in an era when there was widespread use of junk science in criminal courtrooms across the country, and numerous scandals in state and federal forensic laboratories. This led to a reckoning in 2009, when the National Academy of Sciences released a report that was deeply critical of how police and prosecutors were misusing science in criminal prosecutions nationwide. That report sent shockwaves through the system that continue to reverberate today. But the Cressey decision became one of the most cited and discussed cases in the modern history of New Hampshire criminal procedure. The decision undoubtedly limited the spread of unreliable social science and junk science evidence from other States into the Granite State over the last three decades. These companion cases fundamentally transformed New Hampshire criminal practice by recognizing for the first time that trial courts may order the defense to provide discovery to the prosecution in a criminal trial. Until these decisions, while such discovery may have been ordered on a case by case basis, there was no system-wide recognition that the defense may be ordered to produce witness statements and investigative reports to the prosecution. Prior to the decision, many judges and practitioners viewed such orders to violate the defendant's 5th Amendment privilege, attorney work product doctrine, etc.

After the Chagnon and Drewry decisions, prosecutors began routinely requesting and demanding discovery from the criminal defendant Litigation frequently arose about what was discoverable and what was not Criminal defense lawyers struggled with whether they should change the way they investigate cases and document the file in order to minimize the amount of discoverable material, implicating ethical issues as well as strategic considerations. “Reciprocal discovery” rules were incorporated into our court rules, often raising more questions than answers. These decisions changed the landscape of New Hampshire criminal procedure more than any other court decision in the last thirty years.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
2020
Case
State v. Jones, 172 N.H. 774 (2020)
Summary
The race of the defendant is relevant to determining whether she/he would feel free to leave and therefore relevant to whether they were in custody for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of a search and seizure.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1981
Case
State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53 (1981)
Summary
Recognizes that a defendant's right to produce all proofs favorable may overcome statutory and/or evidentiary rules of evidence.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1992
Case
State v. Gagne, 136 N.H. 101 (1992)
Summary
Recognizes that a defendant's right to produce all proofs favorable may overcome privilege assertions.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1983
Case
State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226 (1983)
Summary
Sets a higher standard for search and seizure under NH Constitution.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1993
Case
State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402 (1993)
Summary
Discusses the risks of the State using soft science, such as alleged connection between certain behaviors and sexual victimization, in the prosecution of defendant's charged with sexual assault.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1982
Case
Stapleford v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 1083 (1982)
Summary
A defendant has an array of due process rights that include the right to counsel, a hearing and cross-examination when a court is asked to impose a suspended sentence on the defendant.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1983
Case
State v. Ball, 124 N.H 226 (1983)
Summary
New Hampshire Supreme Court will first address defendant's contention under State Constitution, since state's citizens are entitled to independent interpretation of state constitutional guarantees. With this conclusion, the Court put itself at the vanguard of creating state constitutional rights more protective of criminal defendants than their equivalent federal constitutional rights. It is the parent of any number of such cases.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1995
Case
State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376 (1995)
Summary
The federal good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in New Hampshire and anticipatory search warrants are not permissible.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
2017
Case
State v. Cora, 170 N.H. 186 (2017)
Summary
The Court rejects the federal automobile exception to the search warrant requirement which allows the police to search a car if the have probable cause but no warrant.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1995
Case
State v. Drewry, 139 N.H. 678 (1995)
Summary
The defendant has an obligation to provide a measure of reciprocal discovery in a criminal case, including a list of actual trial witnesses, expert reports and witness statements.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
2003
Case
State v. Goss, 150 N.H. 46 (2003)
Summary
The Court finds that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage one leaves at the end of the driveway for pick- up, rejecting the federal standard.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1995
Case
State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325 (1995)
Summary
The Court reverses a first-degree murder conviction, finding that the prosecution failed to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence of a police officer's credibility. The decision led to more than a decade of regulations and statutes relating to the mechanisms for collecting such evidence and making them available for defense counsel.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1982
Case
State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214 (1982)
Summary
The Court rejects the federal test for when a defendant has standing to contest the legality of a search. It holds that a defendant has automatic standing to contest the legality of a car search if they are charged with a crime flowing from that search, ven if they do not have an expectation of privacy in the car.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
2002
Case
State v. Vandebogart, 139 N.H. 145 (1992), State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402 (1993), State v. Hungerford, 142 N.H. 410 (1997) & Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609 (2002)
Summary
In a ten-year sequence of cases, the Court redefines how trial courts should approach the admissibility of scientific and technical evidence in the context of first, Frye challenges, and then Daubert-like challenges.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1983
Case
State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226 (1983)
Summary
In this search and seizure case, the Court made clear that the state constitution has separate and distinct vitality from the federal constitution and, although relevant constitutional provisions are interpreted consistently, the state courts are required to scrutinize state constitutional rights when properly pled. Conviction reversed based on illegal search in violation of Pt. 1, Art. 19, N.H. Const.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1985
Case
State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6 (1985)
Summary
In this juvenile confession case, the Court applied Ball to find greater protections under the state as opposed to the federal constitution for a juvenile upon questioning so that a juvenile in danger of being transferred to the adult system for trial and sentencing must be so advised as part of warnings prior to interrogation as guaranteed by Pt. 1, Art. 15, N.H. Const.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
2002
Case
State v. Don Roache, 148 N.H. 45 (2002)
Summary
Again, applying Ball, the Court found that Pt. 1, Art. 15 of the NH Constitution provides greater protection than does the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution. Specifically, under the NH Constitution, a defendant's waiver of his right to remain silent is invalid if the police fail to tell him that an attorney (in this case, me) is trying to reach him while he is being questioned.
Subject
Criminal Law
Sub Subject
Date
1982
Case
Stapleford v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 1083 (1982)
Summary
Recognizes that numerous constitutional rights apply to post conviction efforts to imprison a criminal defendant including her/his right to confront the evidence against him as opposed to a pro forma hearing.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Claremont Cases
Date
1993
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183 (1993)
Summary
I could just list the ten Claremont cases and be done with this assignment. Seriously, I would include Claremont I, II and X because each was a first for New Hampshire. The cites are respectively, Claremont Sch. Distr. V. Governor, 138 N.H. 183 (1993)(recognized right to public education), 142 N.H. 462 (1997)(found constitutional violations of right to public education and tax uniformity) and 144 NH 210 (1999)(created right to attorney fees for constitutional litigation against the state).
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
2000
Case
Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing System) (Claremont IX), 145 N.H. 474 (2000)
Summary
The N.H. Supreme Court declares that a proposed targeted aid plan, which in part relied on local property taxes to pay for the cost of an adequate education, did not pass constitutional muster. The Court urged that the content of a constitutionally adequate education must be defined. It further stated that it is the State (not localities through local property taxes) that must provide sufficient funds for each school district to furnish a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
1998
Case
Opinion of the Justices (School Financing) (Claremont IV), 142 N.H. 892 (1998)
Summary
The NH Supreme Court declared that the proffered ABC funding plan developed by Governor Shaheen did not pass muster as providing for a constitutionally acceptable State tax scheme due to its special abatement feature for taxpayers in property- rich districts. The special abatement provision was deemed to be not supported by good cause or just reasons consistent with the constitution. It resulted in the effective tax rate [being] reduced below the uniform State education tax rate in any town that can raise more revenue than it needs to provide the legislatively defined 'adequate education for its children.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
1999
Case
Opinion of the Justices (Tax Plan Referendum) (Claremont VI), 143 N.H. 429 (1999)
Summary
The NH Supreme Court declared a proposed tax plan referendum to be inappropriate. The Court stated that [r]eferenda on legislation are unconstitutional in this State, and there was no exception to this rule in regard to the taxing power.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
2001
Case
Sirrell v. State (Claremont X), 146 N.H. 364 (2001)
Summary
The N.H Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, rejected a constitutional challenge to the statewide property tax to fund education. With respect to the plaintiffs' challenge under Part II, Article 5 of the State Constitution, the majority determined that the plaintiffs had not presented statistical data that provided a comprehensive and reliable picture of the actual operation of the statewide property tax system, and that this was fatal to their claim.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Londonderry Cases
Date
2008
Case
Londonderry School Dist. SAU #12 v. State, 157 N.H. 734 (2008)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Claremont Cases
Date
1999
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 144 N.H. 210 (1999)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Claremont Cases
Date
1997
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462 (1997)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Teacher Non-Renewal Decisions
Date
1990
Case
Ferreira v. Bedford Sch. Dist., 133 N.H. 785 (1990)
Summary
A school nurse is not a professional engaged in teaching, and is not entitled to the protections of RSA 189:14-a.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
2000
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 145 N.H. 474 (2000)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
1999
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 143 N.H. 429 (1999)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
1998
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 142 N.H. 892 (1998)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
2002
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 147 N.H. 499 (2002)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
1999
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 144 N.H. 590 (1999)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
1999
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 144 N.H. 210 (1999)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
1998
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 143 N.H. 154 (1998)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
1998
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 737 (1998)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
1997
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462 (1997)
Summary
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
City School Districts
Date
1971
Case
Laconia Bd. of Educ. v. City of Laconia, 111 N.H. 389 (1971)
Summary
With regard to appropriations for school funds, the city council cannot refuse to appropriate money for statutory mandated services and programs and cannot refuse to appropriate funds to meet the minimum standards required by the State Board of Education.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Collective Bargaining/Labor
Date
2016
Case
Appeal of Farmington Sch. Dist., 168 N.H. 726 (2016)
Summary
The Department of Education correctly concluded that the School Board was wrong to terminate a school counselor for insubordination and breaching student confidentiality where the counselor took steps to keep a student's pregnancy confidential (even from parent) and helped her in seeking an abortion contrary to decision of principal. The Court found that the counselor's actions were not contrary to district policies. In this case, there was a question of whether disclosure to the parent would threaten the student's safety. The proper remedy in this instance was reinstatement.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Board Membership/Bias
Date
2004
Case
Appeal of Hopkinton Sch. Dist., 151 N.H. 478 (2004)
Summary
A school board may conduct a non-renewal hearing, absent a showing of actual bias or prejudice. The school board is presumed to be of conscience and capable of reaching a just and fair result, and the board must find that there was more than prior involvement . . . to bar the [school board] from conducting the hearing on actual bias grounds. This decision also includes the minimum standards for an administrative agency that rejects a hearing officer's advisory decision, including an adequate explanation of the grounds for the decision.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Collective Bargaining/Labor
Date
2017
Case
Appeal of Nashua Sch. Dist., 170 N.H. 386 (2017)
Summary
School district did not commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the Union concerning its plan to lay off its custodial employees and replace them with subcontracted workers after the expiration of the prior collective bargaining agreement, and this decision did not modify the existing bargaining unit.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
City School Districts
Date
1958
Case
City of Franklin v. Hinds, 101 N.H. 344 (1958)
Summary
The city council appropriates funds for the school board, and the school board exercises its general management and control of the public school within the limits of the total appropriation. The school board may transfer funds within line items, but does not have the authority to spend in excess of the total amount appropriated by the city council.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Claremont Cases
Date
1993
Case
Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183 (1993)
Summary
These cases established that a constitutionally adequate public education is a fundamental right, and that that the State of New Hampshire is responsible for providing a constitutionally adequate education for every educable child in public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee adequate funding. The State may not shift this responsibility to local communities. If property taxes are used to perform this duty, the property tax constitutes a State tax, which must be administered in a manner that is equal in valuation and uniform in rate throughout the State. What constitutes a constitutionally adequate education is up to the legislature in the first instance; however, there must be sufficient standards for holding the State accountable.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
NHIAA
Date
1982
Case
Duffley v. N.H. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 122 N.H. 484 (1982)
Summary
This case established that the NHIAA's activities (sponsoring, administering, regulating and supervising interscholastic athletics in New Hampshire) constitutes State action under the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution and the State Constitution, and that the right of a student to participate in interscholastic athletics is one that is entitled to the protections of procedural due process under the State Constitution. At a minimum, this require notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to a determination that a student is not eligibility to participate in interscholastic athletics.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Collective Bargaining/Labor
Date
1974
Case
Farrelly v. Timberlane Regn'l Sch. Dist., 114 N.H. 560 (1974)
Summary
Teachers who participate in an illegal strike are not entitled to the rights of tenured teachers and may be discharged without a hearing.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Authority to Enter into Contracts
Date
2005
Case
Foote v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 152 N.H. 599 (2005)
Summary
The school board, as the governing body of a school district, has the authority to enter into contracts on behalf of a school district. The legislative body has the authority to raise and appropriate money, through the annual meeting process. With regard to tuition agreements, the school board may enter into contracts with other districts, and the legislative body raises and appropriate funds to carry out the contract. This case also discusses the standard for ratification of a contract by the legislative body.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
District of Liability/Sending and Receiving District Determinations
Date
1983
Case
In re Gary B., 124 N.H. 28 (1983)
Summary
For purposes of determining the district of liability, the term resided refers to the place where a child actually lived rather than to legal residence or domicile, and the phrase 'district in which the child last resided before placement in a [facility]' means the place where the child most recently lived outside of a facility.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
2008
Case
Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State (Claremont XIII), 157 N.H. 734 (2008)
Summary
The N.H. Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, declared the case moot, after the Legislature had enacted certain reforms.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Collective Bargaining/Labor
Date
1995
Case
Appeal of Alton Sch. Dist., 140 N.H. 303 (1995)
Summary
In this case, the Court held that an automatic renewal clause in a collective bargaining agreement is a cost item, which must be approved by the voters. The voters must be aware of the automatic renewal clause and of its financial impact. The Court also held that health insurance benefits are conditions of employment, which must be paid after a collective bargaining agreement has expired, while the parties are in the status quo.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Municipal Immunity
Date
2015
Case
Lamb v. Shaker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 168 N.H. 47 (2015)
Summary
[T]he RSA 507-B:2 exception to municipal immunity requires a nexus between the claim and the governmental unit's ownership, occupation, or operation of its physical premises. (emphasis in original). [S]imply because the alleged injury occurs in connection with the enterprise conducted on the defendant's premises does not mean that it arose out of the defendant's operation of the physical premises.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Teacher Non-Renewal Decisions
Date
1987
Case
Littky v. Winchester Sch. Dist., 129 N.H. 626 (1987)
Summary
Contract provisions that attempt to remove the protections of RSA 189:14-a (non-renewal requirements) are void, and a principal is entitled to the protections of RSA 189:14-a.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
The Londonderry Cases
Date
2006
Case
Londonderry School Dist. SAU #12 v. State, 154 N.H. 153 (2006)
Summary
These cases address a bill which revised the manner in which the State funded education. The Court noted that the Claremont cases discussed above issued four mandates, namely to define an adequate education, determine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and ensure its delivery through accountability. While the petitioners raised several objections to the bill in question, the Court only addressed the first, holding that the bill was unconstitutional because it failed to define a constitutionally adequate education. In doing so, the Court held that general and aspirational goals were insufficient, and that the State was required to create specific, substantive criteria for implementation. It stayed the other questions presented with the expectation that the State will define with specificity the components of a constitutionally adequate education prior to a set date. The legislature then passed several statutes which both defined a constitutionally adequate education and paved the way for determining its cost. Therefore, because the bill in question was no longer in effect, the Court dismissed the petitioner's case as moot.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Right to Know Law
Date
1972
Case
Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 112 N.H. 160 (1972)
Summary
Under the Right to Know law, individuals have the right to disclosure of individual teachers' salaries.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Duty of Care
Date
1995
Case
Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708 (1995)
Summary
Districts and/or school administrative units have a duty not to hire or retain employees that it knows or should know have a propensity for sexually abusing students. If the plaintiff can establish that the school knew, or reasonably should have known of such a propensity, then the school will be liable for the foreseeable sexual abuse of students by that employee. Failure to report abuse, in accordance with RSA 169-C:29, can give rise to civil liability, provided the plaintiff can show that reporting would have prevented the subsequent abuse. Individual employees with a supervisory relationship over students who have actual knowledge of abuse or are aware of facts which would lead a reasonable person to conclude a student is being abused, are subject to liability if their level of supervision is unreasonable and is a proximate cause of the student's injury. Superintendents and principals owe a duty of supervision to each student; that duty is not satisfied by entrusting a student to the care of an employee who the superintendent or principal knows, or should know, poses a threat to a student.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Duty of Care
Date
2009
Case
Mikell v. Sch. Admin. Unit #33, 158 N.H. 723 (2009)
Summary
The duty of reasonable supervision does not create a duty to prevent a student's suicide.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Collective Bargaining/Labor
Date
1978
Case
Nazzaro v. Merrimack Sch. Dist., 118 N.H. 287 (1978)
Summary
[T]eachers need not be nominated by the superintendent and elected by the school board under RSA 189:39 (Supp.1975) to be entitled to the protection of RSA 189:14-a. In determining how many years a teacher has taught under RSA 189:14-a, years means calendar years, as opposed to contract years. Therefore, because the plaintiff had taught as a full-time teacher for three years (even though he did not have a contract that whole time), he was entitled to the protections of RSA 189:14-a. Education Law Long-Term Borrowing 1947 Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 499 (1947) Towns may not borrow money for school purposes; that power belongs to school districts. This decision was limited to towns, and did not extend to cities or circumstances where special legislation exists or where a town or district charter may specify otherwise. Education Law Collective Bargaining/Labor 2003 Sanborn Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Budget Comm. of Sanborn Reg'l Sch. Dist., 150 N.H. 241 (2003) This case was the source of the local term Sanbornizing, which is commonly used to describe the circumstances under which costs for a multi-year collective bargaining agreement may be binding on a municipality. In this case, the Court held that a school district could not be bound by a three-year collective bargaining agreement because the voters were not given notice of the salary increases in the second and third years. The Court did hold that, when sufficient notice is given, a municipality may be bound to a multi-year agreement after one year's vote to do so. One example of such notice is warrant language explicitly saying as much. Education Law 1993 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 138 N.H. 183 (1993) Reversing the trial court, the NH Supreme Court construed Part II, Article 83 of the State Constitution as reposing duties upon the State, enforceable in court, to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child in the public schools and to guarantee adequate education. The Court however then declined to define the specifics of an adequate education or the means to provide for it. Education Law 1997 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 142 N.H. 462 (1997) Again reversing the trial court, that had issued an extended decision after a six-week trial on four different counts, the NH Supreme Court (with Justice Horton dissenting) specifically held that the locally levied property tax that supported education constituted a form of State tax and
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
1999
Case
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (State-wide Property Tax Phase-In) (Claremont VII), 144 N.H. 210 (1999)
Summary
The NH Supreme Court (with Justice Horton dissenting) declined to sustain a phase-in for a State property tax scheme. The Court concluded that the proposed phase-in, which would have [t]he practical effect . . . that in fifty 'property rich' towns across the State, the full rate of $6.60 per thousand is imposed gradually over five years, while taxpayers in the remaining towns pay the full rate immediately, was not justified, and was so arbitrary as to serve no useful purpose of a public nature.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
2002
Case
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont XI), 147 N.H. 499 (2002)
Summary
The N.H. Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, ruled that accountability is a component of the State's duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education, and that the State's existing statutory scheme has deficiencies that are inconsistent with the State's duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education. The decision talked of four mandates that the State had acknowledged to issue from Claremont I and II: define an adequate education, determine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and ensure its delivery through accountability.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
1999
Case
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont VIII), 144 N.H. 590 (1999)
Summary
The N.H. Supreme Court, grants attorney's fees to the petitioners. The Court granted such fees on the basis that the petitioners have, in the litigation, conferred a substantial benefit upon the general public.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
2006
Case
Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State (Claremont XII), 154 N.H. 153 (2006)
Summary
The N.H. Supreme Court, with three Justices concurring fully, and two Justices concurring specially in part, and dissenting in part, declared that that State still had not developed distinct substantive content to what constitutes adequacy so the cost thereof may be isolated. The Court retained jurisdiction, threatening to impose remedies if the political branches fail, per a deadline, to define with specificity the components of a constitutionally adequate education.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
1971
Case
Laconia Bd. of Education v. City of Laconia, 285 A.2d 793 (1971)
Summary
The N.H. Supreme Court observed, among other things, that the City was obliged to appropriate sufficient funds for the Board of Education to meet the minimum standards required by the State Board of Education. The Court declined to decide the constitutional question as to whether the State's education funding system was violative of the equal protection guarantees of the Federal Constitution, in part because it would require a financial and statistical background which is not available in this case or in the record.
Subject
Education Law
Sub Subject
Date
2021
Case
Contoocook Valley School Dist. v. State, 174 N.H. 154 (2021)
Summary
The New Hampshire Supreme Court unanimously reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment relief in favor of the plaintiffs, sending the case back for further proceedings going to, in particular and among other things, whether the State's funding statute, RSA 198:40a, II a, fails to sufficiently fund an adequate education in violation of Part II, Article 83 of the State Constitution. The Court also upheld the trial court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and it reversed the trial court's grant of the plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees.
Subject
Employment Law
Sub Subject
Date
1981
Case
Cloutier v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.,121 N.H. 915 (1981)
Summary
The Court in the Cloutier case recognized the right to challenge a wrongful termination when the employee was terminated for conduct that was consistent with public policy or for refusing to engage in conduct that violated public policy. Public policy was considered a fact to be determined by the jury. This last component, regarding the public policy determination, distinguishes New Hampshire's jurisprudence from that of the surrounding states.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
Date
2019
Case
Appeal of Northern Pass Transmission, 172 N.H. 385 (2019)
Summary
The Court upheld the Site Evaluation Committee's denial of a certificate of authority to construct a very high profile, high- voltage transmission line in the state, finding that the SEC had acted in accordance with the authority granted to it by the Legislature. This is by far the biggest case ever to come before the Site Evaluation Committee.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
Date
1980
Case
Public Service Company of New Hampshire v. Town of Hampton, 120 N.H. 68 (1980)
Summary
The Court determined that the Towns only have such powers as are granted to them by the legislature and whatever power they have to regulate the location of transmission lines cannot be exercised in any way that is inconsistent with state law. The Town was therefore preempted from regulating the siting of transmission lines by the law which gave that authority to the Site Evaluation Committee.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
Date
2010
Case
Appeal of Pennichuck Water Works, 160 N.H. 18 (2010)
Summary
The Court found that there is a rebuttable presumption under eminent domain authority that a municipality's acquisition of a privately owned utility is in the public interest. In determining whether the purpose for which property is being condemned is a public use, a court must consider the extent to which the proposed project will benefit the public use, and that this authority is limited to the taking of assets that are within that municipality. The Court determined that the PUC engaged in a proper analysis in deciding to grant the public taking of the water company's assets within the municipality and imposing certain conditions on the purchase. This was a significant case before the PUC that lasted for years.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
Date
1996
Case
Appeal of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 141 N.H. 13 (1996)
Summary
The Court upheld a decision by a majority of the NH Public Utilities Commission that electric utility franchises were not exclusive as a matter of law and the PUC had the statutory authority to permit retail competition, paving the way for restructuring of the electric industry.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
Date
1991
Case
Appeal of Richards, 134 N.H. 148 (1991)
Summary
The Court upheld an order of the PUC approving the rate plan pertaining to Public Service Company of New Hampshire when it was reorganized out of bankruptcy as a result of its investment in the Seabrook Nuclear Plant. The Court determined that the regulation of utilities and setting of rates is the unique province of the legislature, and under the authority granted to the PUC by the legislature, the PUC was not constitutionally required to apply traditional ratemaking principles.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
Date
1986
Case
Appeal of the Conservation Law Foundation, 127 N.H. 606 (1986)
Summary
The Court said that the record contained sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the PUC that the completion of the first unit of the Seabrook nuclear power facility was economically desirable as compared with alternatives. The Court also determined that the PUC has flexibility in determining what may qualify as used and useful and be allowable rate base property, and that the burden of excess generating capacity may be shared between investors and customers. This contributed to the PSNH bankruptcy.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
Date
1984
Case
Appeal of the Seacoast Anti Pollution League, 125 N.H. 465 (1984)
Summary
The Court found that public remarks of the Chair of the PUC pertaining to a case that was pending before the Commission required that he disqualify himself from proceedings in which his impartiality might be reasonably questioned. This has had a lasting impact on administrative adjudicators and the need to maintain impartiality.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
NH Public Utilities Commission (NH PUC) Cases
Date
2001
Case
Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayers Rights & a., 145 N.H. 671 (2001)
Summary
Holding: The Court upheld NH PUC's order approving a settlement agreement that resolved federal court litigation filed by PSNH challenging the NH PUC's 1997 plan to restructure the state's electric industry. In so doing, the Court enunciated the principle that the Court will give the PUC's policy choices considerable deference. The Court determined that the charge allowing PSNH to recover stranded investments, i.e. costs that would not be recovered in a competitive market, was not an unconstitutional taking. The Court held that because the overall rate produced by the settlement agreement was within the zone of reasonableness, it was not permissible to review the stranded cost component in isolation. The Court also held that although the used and useful principle requires that only property that is used and useful in the generation of electricity be included in a utility's rate base, this principle is not constitutionally mandated. In addition, the Court noted that the PUC's regulatory authority is not limited to monopolies.

Significance: This decision ended protracted federal court litigation that blocked the NH PUC from implementing its electric industry restructuring plan with respect to PSNH. After holding 33 days of hearing, the NH PUC approved the settlement agreement (with modifications) on April 19, 2000. On June 12, 2000, the legislature enacted Laws of 2000, Ch. 249 providing that, with some modifications, the NH PUC's April 19th order was in the public interest. The settlement agreement was significant in that it allowed PSNH to impose a stranded cost charge, but also required PSNH to write off nearly $400 million of its stranded investments, thereby requiring PSNH's investors to bear a portion of its stranded costs
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
NH Site Evaluation Committee (NH SEC) Cases
Date
2011
Case
Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayers' Rights, 162 N.H. 245 (2011)
Summary
Holding: Because appellants did not meet statutory definition of petitioners, they lacked standing to seek a declaratory ruling on whether the installation of a scrubber at Merrimack Station constituted a sizeable change or addition to an energy facility that required NH SEC approval. Appellants' lack of standing deprived NH SEC of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby rendering void its decision on the merits (i.e., that the scrubber was not a sizeable change or addition). NH SEC also lacked statutory or inherent authority to assess fees and costs against appellants because they were not applicants for certificates of site and facility.

Significance: Case involved Merrimack Station, one of only three remaining coal-fired generators in the New England. Installation of the scrubber (without having first obtained NH SEC approval) allowed this facility to remain functioning even though the region is moving away from fossil fuel generation.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
NH Public Utilities Commission (NH PUC) Cases
Date
1984
Case
Appeal of Easton, 125 N.H. 205 (1984)
Summary
Holding: NH PUC has a duty to determine, whether under all the circumstances, a proposed utility financing is in the public good – a determination that includes considerations beyond the terms of the proposed borrowing. The Court reversed the NH PUC's determination that its review of NH Electric Co-Operative's proposed borrowing of $54,000,000 to enable it to continue to finance its share of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant was simply limited to 1) the amount of the financing, and 2) the reasonableness of its costs and terms. The Court remanded the case to the NH PUC pursuant to RSA 541:14, noting that the statute permits remand if the court shall be of the opinion that justice requires the reception of evidence of facts which have occurred since the hearing.... In remanding the case, the Court noted information surrounding the construction of the controversial Seabrook Nuclear Power Project which had come to light after the NH PUC's decision was issued, i.e., new cost estimates, PSNH's repeated statements that it is on the brink of bankruptcy, termination of work at Seabrook, completion of Unit II has been seriously questioned, and new cost and completion date estimates have greatly exceeded the past figures and dates.

Significance: After this decision, NH PUC financing proceedings are commonly referred to Easton hearings.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
NH Site Evaluation Committee (NH SEC) Cases
Date
2019
Case
Appeal of Northern Pass Transmission, LLC & a., 172 N.H. 385 (2019)
Summary
Holding: NH Supreme Court upheld NH SEC decision denying application for high voltage transmission line on the ground that the applicant failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the project would not unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region, as required by RSA 162-H:16, IV(b). Court's review is limited to determining whether NH SEC's findings are supported by competent record evidence, and are not erroneous as a matter of law. In so doing, Court defers to NH SEC's resolutions of conflicting testimony, determination of witnesses' credibility, and weight to be given to evidence. Court does not reweigh the evidence or determine whether it would have credited one expert over another. Significance: This case involved the siting of a controversial electric transmission line that would have spanned 192 miles in NH to bring hydropower from Quebec to Massachusetts. The NH SEC proceeding involved testimony from 154 witnesses, over 2,000 exhibits, 160 intervenors, seven site visits, and 70 days of adjudicative hearings.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
NH Public Utilities Commission (NH PUC) Cases
Date
1982
Case
Appeal of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 122 N.H. 1062 (1982)
Summary
Holding: NH PUC had no authority to prohibit PSNH temporarily from using proceeds from future financings for Seabrook Unit II. NH PUC's role is to regulate so that the constitutional rights of free trade and private enterprise are disrupted as little as possible. PSNH acquired a vested right to build the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant by virtue of having been issued a certificate of site and facility, and expending hundreds of millions of dollars for the project. The NH PUC's interference with PSNH's vested right (i.e. prohibiting the expenditure of financing proceeds on Seabrook Unit II) constituted inverse condemnation which required that PSNH be afforded due process and just compensation. NH PUC's determination that PSNH was imprudent by increasing its workforce violated PSNH's due process rights, as the prudence issue was not noticed for hearing, and because the increase in workforce information was obtained from PSNH by the NH PUC chairman through an ex parte communication of which PSNH's counsel was unaware. When performing an adjudicative role, the PUC must comport itself accordingly. Due process requires that members of the NH PUC refrain from ex parte communications if such agency is not only to be, but also to appear to be, impartial.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
NH Public Utilities Commission (NH PUC) Cases
Date
1996
Case
Appeal of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 141 N.H. 13 (1996)
Summary
Holding: Upon a public good determination, the NH PUC has statutory authority to permit retail competition within the service territories of PSNH, since PSNH's franchise rights are not exclusive as a matter of law. Administrative gloss doctrine is inapplicable where controlling statute (RSA 374:26) is unambiguous, and where NH PUC had repeatedly declared that competing franchises may be granted.

Significance: This decision opened the door to electric industry restructuring in NH. Eight days after the Court's decision, RSA 374-F (Electric Industry Restructuring) was enacted, thereby allowing for retail competition in the energy sector of NH's electric industry.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
NH Public Utilities Commission (NH PUC) Cases
Date
1979
Case
Legislative Utility Consumers' Counsel v. Public Service Company of New Hampshire & a. 119 N.H. 332 (1979)
Summary
Holding: The Court upheld the NH PUC's decision that PSNH could include CWIP associated with the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant in PSNH's ratebase. This case articulates several legal principles associated with utility ratesetting: NH PUC has broad discretion to act in the public interest; NH PUC must exercise its own expertise and skills in setting rates; Court does not engage in factfinding or policymaking when reviewing NH PUC decisions; Court will not reverse a NH PUC order unless it is unlawful, unjust, or unreasonable, or reflects and abuse of discretion; ultimate test of NH PUC's decision is whether the evidence demonstrates that the rates were just and reasonable; utility's rates must be sufficient to yield not less than a reasonable return on the cost of the utility's property that is used and useful in the public service, less accrued depreciation; a public utility is entitled to a just and reasonable rate base, and a just and reasonable return thereon; determination of whether a public utility's plant under construction and property held for future use are used and useful is a essentially a question of fact for the NH PUC; used and useful is not a rigid concept; public utility must be able to earn revenue sufficient to maintain its credit and attract capital needed to meet increase demands for improvement and extension of its services; ratemaking must take into account the need for the utility to maintain confidence of its investors; NH PUC is not compelled to accept the opinion evidence of any one witness or group of witnesses; principle that revenues and expenses must be matched over a given test year does not bar NH PUC from including CWIP in rate base; when taking notice of facts and information that are not in its own records or in the hearing record, NH PUC must give parties adequate notice and opportunity to challenge and rebut matters to be administratively noticed; administrative notice cannot be taken contemporaneously with the rendering of a decision; NH PUC has discretion to determine which methodology to employ in calculating a utility's test year revenues; statutory scheme for public utility regulation mandated by the legislature in RSA 378 clearly expresses an intent that the NH PUC be afforded wide parameters within which to exercise its judgment; although legal, it was not good practice for the NH PUC to grant a revenue increase in advance of a utility's revised tariff filing; property not devoted to the production and delivery of
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
NH Public Utilities Commission (NH PUC) Cases
Date
1988
Case
Petition of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 130 N.H. 265 (1988) (PSNH v. NH, 488 U.S. 1035, 109 S. Ct. 858, 102 L. Ed2d 983, appeal dismissed.)
Summary
Holding: Anti-CWIP statute (RSA 378:30-a) forbids return on or recovery of investments through utility rates before a project is completed and providing service to customers. Application of the anti-CWIP statute to the facts presented would not violate the US or NH Constitutions, which only require that the NH PUC engage in a rational process of balancing consumer and shareholder interests to produce a just and reasonable rate. A just and reasonable rate is one that falls within the zone of reasonableness between confiscation of utility property and ratepayer exploitation. RSA 378:30-a is a reaffirmation of the used and useful concept standing for the proposition that the direct consequences of investment risks for new plants must be borne by investors, not ratepayers. Fundamental changes in this risk allocation are policy matters for the legislature, not constitutional matters for the courts.

Significance: Three days after this decision was issued, PSNH filed for bankruptcy due to its inability to charge ratepayers for costs associated with the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant which had been constructed but was not yet operating. PSNH was the first investor-owned utility to file for bankruptcy since the Great Depression.
Subject
Energy/Environment
Sub Subject
NH Site Evaluation Committee (NH SEC) Cases
Date
1980
Case
PSNH v. Town of Hampton & a., 120 N.H. 68 (1980)
Summary
Holding: By enacting a comprehensive statute regarding a state process for deciding all matters regarding the construction of energy facilities covered by the statute, the legislature preempted any power that municipalities might have had regarding facilities embraced by the statute. Accordingly, Towns could not compel the burial of a transmission line that the NH SEC had certificated as an overhead line.

Significance: This case is often cited for the proposition that the NH SEC process for siting energy facilities preempts local zoning and planning regulations that would otherwise apply.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Standing of Concerned Citizens
Date
2011
Case
Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayers' Rights, 162 N.H. 245 (2011)
Summary
In 2006, New Hampshire statutes were amended to require a pollution control device be installed to an existing electric generating facility by 2013. As the plan to do so was underway, several plaintiffs appealed an associated administrative agency decision. The plaintiffs included a national nonprofit, a regional nonprofit, energy companies engaged in green and/or renewable energy generation, and a group of individuals formed for the purpose of challenging the plan. Despite assertions that the plaintiff group contained ratepayers who would be affected by the cost of installing the pollution control, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The primary rationale was that the administrative agency whose decision the plaintiffs sought to challenge had only the limited powers conferred to it by statute.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Public Interest/ Constitutionality
Date
1975
Case
Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124 (1975)
Summary
This is another early environmental case where the Court determined that a state statute prohibiting the filling of tidal wetlands (RSA Chapter 483-A) is not an unconstitutional taking. The Court held that if the action of the State is a valid exercise of the police power proscribing activities that could harm the public, then there is no taking under the eminent domain clause.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Preemption Cases
Date
2004
Case
North Country Environmental Services, Inc. v. Town of Bethlehem, 150 N.H. 606 (2004)
Summary
This Supreme Court opinion concluded that New Hampshire's solid waste management statutes did not fully preempt the entire field of solid waste management. While the Court ruled that RSA Chapter 149-M constituted a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme governing the design, construction, operation and closure of solid waste management facilities, it nevertheless allowed for certain local ordinances to apply if not inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of Chapter 149- M. It also held that a town ordinance regulating the location of a landfill was not preempted by state law.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Agency Deference
Date
2019
Case
Appeal of Northern Pass Transmission, LLC, 172 N.H. 385 (2019)
Summary
In what may have been New Hampshire's largest administrative proceeding, involving 70 days of adjudicative hearings and much more, an administrative agency denied approval of an electric transmission line. Upon appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the agency's denial. It is a recent and compelling example of agency deference, specifically that the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review is limited to determining whether the agency's findings are supported by competent evidence in the record and are not erroneous as a matter of law. In particular, that the Court defers to the agency, as the trier-of- fact, in resolution of conflicts in the testimony and determination of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given evidence.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Right to Dock via ROW
Date
1994
Case
Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561 (1994)
Summary
In a case about property boundaries and the location and use of a deeded right of way for access to the shore of a lake, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided an unrestricted right-of-way to the shore of a lake shore includes the right to a dock.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Indirect Impacts to Wetlands
Date
2006
Case
Greenland Conservation Comm'n v. N.H. Wetlands Council, 154 N.H. 529 (2006)
Summary
The New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services issued a wetland permit for a 79-lot housing development. The permit allowed direct impacts to wetlands (meaning those physically in the wetland) and indirect impacts (meaning those next to or near the wetland that would eventually cause a negative impact to the wetland). After appeal to and affirmance by several reviewing agencies and the Superior Court, ultimately, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the New Hampshire statutes that govern the permitting of impacts to wetlands do not confer authority on DES to regulate indirect impacts. Instead, DES is authorized to regulate only direct impact to wetlands.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
State Pre-emption
Date
2004
Case
N. Country Envtl. Servs. v. Town of Bethlehem, 150 N.H. 606 (2004)
Summary
Lawsuit about whether and to what extent a municipality's laws applied to a landfill. In its decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided RSA 149-M, governing disposal of solid waste, constitutes a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing design, construction, and operation of solid waste management facilities. Because of that, the state statutory scheme preempts municipal regulation. But, the decision states an exception: solid waste facilities could be required to obtain municipal approval where such approval did not conflict with the state statutory scheme. Key take away: RSA 149-M:9, VII allows towns to decide, through zoning, where landfills are located.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Variance: Unnecessary Hardship
Date
2001
Case
Simplex Techs., Inc. v. Town of Newington, 145 N.H. 727 (2001)
Summary
An applicant must meet several requirements to obtain a variance from a local zoning board of adjustment. The most difficult, by almost all measures, is the requirement to prove the applicant would endure an unnecessary hardship if the board did not grant the variance. The New Hampshire Supreme Court and the Legislature had tinkered with the interpretation and wording of this requirement over a couple of decades. The Simplex decision somewhat loosened the requirement for proving unnecessary hardship. The decision's wording was adopted in large part by the Legislature when it rewrote the law in 2009 to codify the holding in Simplex, currently RSA 674:33, I(b).
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Public Interest/ Constitutionality
Date
2007
Case
Anderson v. Motorsport Holdings, LLC, 155 N.H. 491 (2007)
Summary
This case is significant because it upheld a local wetlands ordinance against challenges of constitutional vagueness, selective enforcement and administrative gloss, among others. In addition, the Court upheld the validity of the ordinance's regulation of a 25-foot buffer setback from wetlands as well as the wetlands themselves.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Public Interest/ Constitutionality
Date
1986
Case
Bagley v. Controlled Environment Corp., 127 N.H. 556 (1986)
Summary
This case is foundational for providing liability where hazardous wastes disposed of on one person's property migrates to property of another landowner. The Court in Bagley declined to impose strict liability in the absence of statutory strict liability and the absence of any demonstration that the requirement to prove legal fault acts as a practical barrier to otherwise meritorious claims. However, the latter part of the Court's opinion affirmed the availability of an action for the disposal of the waste material predicated on a statutory violation of RSA chapter 147-A, New Hampshire's hazardous waste laws. As such, it also provides the basis for a negligence claim. Citing Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 52, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972), the Court noted that it is well established law in this State that a causal violation of a statutory standard of conduct constitutes legal fault in the same manner as does the causal violation of a common-law standard of due care, that is, causal negligence.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Public Interest/ Constitutionality
Date
2007
Case
N.H. Department of Environmental Services v. Marino, 155 N.H. 709 (2007)
Summary
This case involved the appeal of homeowners of the Superior Court findings of violations of several environmental statutes, and imposition of fines for such violations, by reason of constructing a home within 50 feet of a NH lake, dredging and filling in wetlands, and failing to obtain a permit or DES approval for such acts. The Court denied the homeowners challenge of the Shoreland Protection Act and specifically RSA 483-B:10 as being impermissibly vague and an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The Court also held that digging a trench and refilling it after it is dug constitutes excavat[ing], remov[ing], fill[ing], or dredg[ing] as those terms are used in the Wetlands Act (RSA Chapter 482-A).
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Public Interest/ Constitutionality
Date
1977
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 749 (1977)
Summary
In this case the State Legislature had transferred to the Supreme Court several questions regarding the constitutionality of a statute creating the New Hampshire Oil Pollution Control Fund to be funded by license fees and other charges imposed on large oil storage facilities located in state. The Court found that the statute (RSA Chapter 146-A) did not violate either the New Hampshire or the federal constitution.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Preemption Cases
Date
1982
Case
Stablex Corp. v. Town of Hooksett, 22 N.H. 1091(1982)
Summary
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in this case held that the State hazardous waste statutes, RSA chapters 147-A through 147-D devised a comprehensive and detailed program of statewide regulation, which on its face must be viewed as preempting any local actions having the intent or the effect of frustrating it. Since this decision, however, the Court has carved out exceptions to this broad preemption interpretation.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Public Interest/ Constitutionality
Date
1985
Case
State v. Charpentier, 126 N.H. 56 (1985)
Summary
This case is one of the earliest cases dealing with environmental liability for the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes. The facts in this case disclose the ongoing operation of a hazardous waste dump at Gilson Road in Nashua, New Hampshire, owned by Charpentier, as well as repeated attempts by the State to abate this public nuisance (which property later becomes a federal Superfund Site due to the costs of cleanup). The State sued Mary Charpentier, William Sylvester. John D. Tinkham, Chem- Waste, Inc. and Cannons Engineering Corporation, for the cost of remediating the hazardous waste site. [There are several related cases involving the defendants Mary Charpentier, William Sylvester and John Tinkham. Both Sylvester and Tinkham were sent to prison based on criminal contempt charges. See Mires v. Sylvester, 120 N.H. 701 (1980), for example.] In Charpentier, the Court held that res judicata based on a prior equitable action compelling removal of construction demolition waste did not bar the state's case in this instance because the issues were different – the defendants had engaged in subsequent disposal of hazardous wastes resulting in far greater public health threats. The Court further held that even if issues in the earlier equitable action to compel removal of all debris and wastes and in subsequent action for the costs of eliminating the hazardous waste dump were identical, relitigation was warranted because the potential adverse impact on the public interest was much greater after hazardous chemical wastes were dumped at the site. The Court affirmed the trial court's verdict for $1,135,700 against Mary Charpentier, representing 10% of the total verdict against all five defendants.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Public Interest/ Constitutionality
Date
2005
Case
State v. Elementis Chemical, Inc., 152 N.H. 794 (2005)
Summary
In this case, the Supreme Court applied civil forfeiture procedures to fine a chemical production company that had abandoned hazardous materials left behind after the chemical company moved to a new facility. The case discusses the definitions of hazardous waste and abandoned materials. The Court also concluded that Rule 407, which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures because admitting this evidence would be unfair to the person who voluntarily remedies a hazardous condition, did not apply in this case because the chemical company had removed the abandoned materials pursuant to an order issued by the State, so its removal actions were not voluntary.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Public Interest/ Constitutionality
Date
2015
Case
State v. ExxonMobil Corp., 168 N.H. 211 (2015)
Summary
This case involves the appeal of a guilty verdict against ExxonMobil based on three causes of action: negligence; strict liability — design defect; and strict liability — failure to warn, related to its manufacture and distribution throughout New Hampshire of MTBE as an additive in gasoline. MTBE was found to have contaminated groundwater throughout the state. The jury awarded imposed an environmental civil liability penalty of $236,372,644. The Court denied all the arguments made by ExxonMobil on appeal, including a separation of powers argument that the State's ODD and GREE Funds precluded civil damages, a federal preemption claim based on the Clean Air Act, and that market share liability is not an acceptable theory of recovery.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Public Interest/ Constitutionality
Date
1896
Case
State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1 (1896)
Summary
This case is one of the earliest environmental cases where the Supreme Court upheld a state statute that prohibited the disposal of sawdust from sawmills into Massabesic Lake, the public water supply for the City of Manchester. It was found to be constitutional as a valid exercise of the State's police power to protect public health.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Preemption Cases
Date
2004
Case
Thayer v. Town of Tilton, 151 N.H. 483 (2004)
Summary
In this case, the Supreme Court found that the state regulatory scheme enacted under RSA chapter 485-A was not so comprehensive and detailed as to suggest a legislative intent to preempt all municipal regulation of sludge waste. Moreover, it noted that the DES rules specifically authorized additional municipal regulation with respect to protecting public health.
Subject
Environmental Law
Sub Subject
Preemption Cases
Date
1966
Case
Town of Pelham v. Browning Ferris Industries of New Hampshire, Inc., 141 N.H. 355 (1996)
Summary
In this case the Supreme Court distinguished between the hazardous waste statutes and the solid waste statutes, indicating that unlike the hazardous waste statutes found to preempt local action in the Stablex case (discussed above), RSA Chapter 149-M provides for extensive local involvement in the management of solid waste. However, in this instance, the State was approving the closure through capping of a solid waste landfill that had been closed for many years. The Court held that with regard to landfill closures, no role is provided for local government and local site plan approvals were not applicable. It also held that materials such as chipped used tires within the layers of the landfill cap were not considered the disposal of solid waste.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
1989
Case
Abrams v. Abrams, 131 N.H. 522 (1989)
Summary
Transfer of assets in anticipation of divorce is dissipation of marital assets. Such assets remain marital assets subject to division by the trial court.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Long-Term Marriage – Property Division
Date
1983
Case
Rahn v. Rahn, 123 N.H. 222 (1983)
Summary
In a long-term marriage, the parties can't go back to their original positions like a short-term marriage. In Rahn the Supreme Court developed a standard for a long-term marriage. Rahn set forth five factors to overcome the presumption that an equal distribution is fair. This includes 1. Fault, 2.Value of Entire Estate, 3. Source of Assets, 4. Minor Children, and 5. Ability to be Self-Supporting.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Disclosure of Finances
Date
1994
Case
Shaftmaster v. Shaftmaster, 138 N.H. 460 (1994)
Summary
The Supreme Court held that full disclosure of finances in the Financial Affidavit are mandatory and cannot be waived by the Court. Once the financial information was requested and provided, the party had an ongoing obligation to provide current and accurate financial information.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Abuse and Neglect
Date
1992
Case
In re Ethan H , 135 N.H. 681 (1992)
Summary
The Supreme Court considered an appeal after a finding that the defendant's son was an abused child. The Supreme Court found that the defendant had presented substantial evidence that the child, although bruised, was not harmed and that DCYS failed to show the child was harmed or injured. The Supreme Court upheld a parent's right to use corporal punishment in disciplining one's children.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Settlement Agreement
Date
1988
Case
Bossi v. Bossi, 131 N.H. 262 (1988)
Summary
Upon the appeal of one party to the trial court's denial of her motion to enforce a settlement agreement entered into by her counsel and counsel for the other party, the Supreme Court held the master was in error in allowing the plaintiff to repudiate the oral settlement agreement which had been entered into within the scope of his attorney's authority. It held that the oral agreement was binding on the parties.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2007
Case
In re Albert and McRae, Jr., 155 N.H. 259 (2007)
Summary
That father reported passive income on his federal income tax return did not require passive income to be included in father's gross income for child-support purposes pursuant to RSA 458-C.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2011
Case
In re Goodlander and Tamposi, 161 N.H. 490 (2011)
Summary
This case defines what provisions in a trust or other circumstances may or may not make trust assets and income marital property. The case distinguishes rulings in Flaherty v. Flaherty, 138 NH 337 (1994) and IMO Chamberlain, 155 NH 13 (2007).
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2005
Case
In the Matter Of Berg vs. Berg, 152 N.H. 658 (2005)
Summary
Minor children have therapist-patient privileges held by their parents. If there is a disagreement between the parents, the Guardian Ad Litem holds the privilege and may submit the disputed therapy records to the Court for an in camera review.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2003
Case
In the Matter Of Blanchflower vs. Blanchflower, 150 N.H. 226 (2003)
Summary
Adultery is defined as sexual intercourse between a man and woman, one of whom is married to another. Same gender sexual conduct does not amount to adultery as a cause for divorce.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2002
Case
In the Matter Of Coderre vs. Coderre, 148 N.H. 401 (2002)
Summary
The Court defines the scope of items for children that child support should be used for and distinguishes health insurance and medical expenses as separate issues from child support.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2014
Case
In the Matter Of Hampers and Hampers, 166 N.H. 422 (2014)
Summary
Father's income from investments in partnerships meant partnership's gross income less expenses necessarily incurred for production of that income. Father, who invested in eight partnerships, and not mother, had burden of showing that partnership expenses claimed were necessary to production of partnerships' income, for purposes of calculating investment income for child support purposes.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2020
Case
In the Matter Of Kamil and Kamil, 173 N.H. 424 (2020)
Summary
A trial court may not delegate its judicial authority and decision-making to a third party such as a Guardian Ad Litem.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2012
Case
In the Matter Of Raybeck and Raybeck, 163 N.H. 570 (2012)
Summary
The Supreme Court defined the elements of cohabitation that might terminate an alimony order. The concepts in this decision were adopted in the amendments to RSA 458:19aa.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2016
Case
In the Matter Of Ross and Ross, 169 N.H. 299 (2016)
Summary
A party seeking a fault divorce must prove that he/she is a faithful and innocent spouse. Adultery post-divorce filing by the previously alleged innocent party bars a fault divorce to that party pursuant to the doctrine of recrimination regardless of the other party's conduct.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Prenuptial Agreements
Date
1989
Case
MacFarlane v. Rich, 132 N.H. 608 (1989)
Summary
In 1989, the New Hampshire Supreme Court established the standard for fairness by which the validity of antenuptial agreements should be determined. The State has a special interest in the subject of antenuptial agreements, and as a result, courts tend to scrutinize these agreements more closely than ordinary commercial contracts.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Date
2000
Case
Tomasko v. Dubuc, 145 N.H. 169 (2000)
Summary
Establishes a framework for analysis of a request for relocation with minor children. This decision was codified in part in RSA 461-A:12.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Alimony/Child Support
Date
2003
Case
In the Matter of Watterworth and Watterworth, 149 N.H. 442 (2003)
Summary
The lower court reduced the amount of child support but ordered alimony, which provides tax benefits to the obligor. The Supreme Court held that: Alimony and child support serve different public policies, are governed by different statutes, are awarded based upon different factors, and are terminated for different reasons. The Supreme Court found that the lower court erroneously allocated child support to the alimony award.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Father of Illegitimate Child
Date
1981
Case
Brauch v. Shaw, 121 N.H. 562 (1981)
Summary
When the unmarried father had performed parental duties for eleven years, acknowledged the child since birth, maintained a close relationship and pattern of visitation, and provided support for the child, the Supreme Court held that the father and child had a right to a continuing relationship under the natural, essential, and inherent rights provision of the New Hampshire constitution.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Alimony
Date
1980
Case
Buckner v. Buckner, 120 N.H. 402 (1980)
Summary
The Buckner case made it so in New Hampshire alimony became gender-neutral. The Supreme Court upheld an alimony award to the husband because it would be a denial of equal protection for a statute to authorize alimony for a wife but not for a husband.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Custody –Stated Preference of the Child
Date
1986
Case
Butterick v. Butterick, 127 N.H. 731 (1986)
Summary
In this case the Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision regarding a thirteen-year-old's strong, clear preference to live with his father. The child was deemed mature enough to decide that he wanted to live with a different parent.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Alimony
Date
1974
Case
Calderwood v. Calderwood, 114 N.H. 651 (1974)
Summary
This case included the famous language that the purpose of alimony is not to provide a lifetime profit-sharing plan. This decision states the primary purpose of alimony is to encourage the recipient spouse to establish an independent source of income, but it includes guidelines to consider as to the amount of alimony, including maintaining the economic level enjoyed during the marriage, as well as the other party's ability to pay. This decision also states that the wife was entitled to some payment for attorneys fees for the post-divorce proceedings. It also states that the court may enter a decree of property division at a later time if additional assets are disclosed or discovered.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Custody
Date
1973
Case
Del Pozzo v. Del Pozzo, 113 N.H. 436 (1973)
Summary
This is the leading case in setting forth the factors to consider in determining the best interest of the child in a custody dispute. The decision states that the paramount and controlling consideration is the overall welfare of the children. The eight considerations were set forth to help the judicial officer to exercise sound discretion.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Property Settlement
Date
1968
Case
Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41 (1968)
Summary
This case states that only alimony and child support final orders can be modified. Property settlements are not subject to modification. A property settlement is binding and not subject to retroactive modification because of a change in circumstances.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Reformation of a Settlement
Date
1980
Case
Grabowski v. Grabowski, 120 N.H. 745 (1980)
Summary
The Supreme Court held that courts have the authority to grant reformation of a property settlement for mutual mistake, which was distinguished from modification based on changed circumstances.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Distribution of Property
Date
1979
Case
Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268 (1979)
Summary
This case set out the rule of equitable distribution of the parties' property. It held that the court has no obligation to divide the parties' property equally. The amount of property to be awarded to a spouse depends on the facts of the case. The court set factors to consider.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Status Pending Appeal
Date
1976
Case
Hille v. Hille, 116 N.H. 109 (1976)
Summary
A temporary decree remains in effect during the course of an appeal of a final decree unless the court orders that the final order will be in effect during the appeal period. The court wrote that in the future cases involving modification of custody orders, the trial court may well consider entry of a stay of the effective date of the order if it appears that the appellate review will be sought and pursued.
Subject
Family Law
Sub Subject
Valuation and Distribution of Pensions
Date
1985
Case
Hodgins v. Hodgins, 126 N.H. 711 (1985)
Summary
This case set a general rule which established that the valuation period of the pension is from the date of marriage to the date of filing the petition for divorce.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Rules of Construction
Date
1976
Case
Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 116 N.H. 636 (1976)
Summary
The tide began to turn with the decision in Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 116 N.H. 636 (1976) when the court adopted the reasonable expectations test. The insured was an electrician who repaired a thermostat in an apartment and the next day learned that a child had died in the apartment from heat prostration after he completed his work and left the site. The Hartford argued that the subsequent action against the electrician arose from completed operations (rather than covered operations in progress), which were excluded from coverage by the policy in a standard provision. The electrician's insurance agent never told him that he was not insured once he left the job and further testified that it never occurred to him that the electrician would not be protected by the policy. The court said that it was unreasonable to expect the electrician who had no experience reading insurance policies to understand that he was not covered given that the insurance agent with twenty years of experience thought he was covered. The court ruled that the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured will be honored even though a painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations. 116 N.H. at 636.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1986
Case
Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521 (1986)
Summary
An occurrence is defined as an accident. Harm resulting from an inherently injurious act which cannot be performed without causing injury cannot be considered to have been caused by an accident even if the harm that results was not intended from the standpoint of the insured.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1988
Case
Jespersen v. USF&G, 131 N.H. 257 (1988)
Summary
Bbreach of agreement to sell house does not result in property damage.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1942
Case
Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 92 N.H. 140 (1942)
Summary
The original Dumas case. The insurer has no positive duty to settle within the policy limit but has a duty to use reasonable judgment in deciding whether to run the risk of an award in excess of the policy limit.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1971
Case
Dumas v. State Farm, 111 N.H. 43 (1971)
Summary
Different Dumas from first case but same issues. NH Supreme court ruled that a plaintiff may maintain an action against an insurer for negligent failure to settle a case without prior payment of or proof of ability to pay the excess judgment. This allowed the defendant in the underlying case to assign his right against his carrier to the underlying plaintiff. Also, at page 48, good discussion about the balancing act an insurance company must exercise. The risk of the insurer varies with the coverage available above the settlement opportunity and the weight the insurer must give to the insured's risk increases as the insurer's surplus coverage decreases. When the surplus coverage is substantial, less weight is required to be given to the insured's interest. Where the settlement opportunity approaches the limit of coverage, then the insurer's duty may be heavily weighted toward the interest of the insured. This comes up often in mediation.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1987
Case
Ellis v. Royal Insurance Companies, et al., 129 N.H. 326 (1987)
Summary
The court adopted the sliding-scale approach when allocating the tortfeasor credit between (or among) two or more uninsured motorist carriers.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
2004
Case
Energynorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, et al., 150 N.H. 828 (2004)
Summary
The court held that injury-in-fact was the trigger of coverage in the policies in question. The case looks at the specific language of the policies so cannot be read as all-inclusive but the reasoning is important. Also, it is important that the court found the trigger was not limited to a single event. Accordingly, the occurrence-based policy at issue is triggered by a 'happening or series of happenings' within the policy period, which is not limited to a single, discrete event. We therefore conclude that, under New Hampshire law, the language of the policy clearly embodies an exposure *841 trigger, and where the alleged migration of toxic wastes is continuing, multiple exposures triggering coverage are also continuing.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1993
Case
Green Mountain Insurance Company v. George, 138 N.H. 10 (1993)
Summary
George injured in MA accident. Action in MA dismissed because medical bills totaled less than the $2,000 MA threshold under its no fault statute. George had a NH policy and sought UM benefits. George prevailed. 1) New Hampshire law governs the construction of the insurance contract; (2) the Georges were legally entitled to recover for injuries, including pain and suffering, proximately caused by the alleged tortfeasor; and (3) the alleged tortfeasor's vehicle was uninsured for purposes of Green Mountain's insurance policy. On conflict of laws, the court said:

We have held that while the underlying action against the tortfeasor is a tort action, the underinsured coverage claim is based in contract. Metropolitan Prop. & Liabil. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 136 N.H. 594,596,620 A.2d 1020, 1022 (1993). In contract cases, we apply the law of the State with the most significant relationship to the contract [to] govern questions regarding the contract's performance. Glowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 134 N.H. 196,198,589 A.2d 593,595 (1991). When the interpretation of insurance policy language is at issue, our interpretation is governed by the law of the state that is the principal location of the insured risk.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1973
Case
Interstate Fire & Casualty Company v. Lee Raceway, Inc., et al., 113 N.H. 593 (1973)
Summary
Petition for a declaratory judgment by insurer seeking a declaration that insurer was not required to provide coverage or defense for any claim arising from accident which occurred to 11-year- old boy, who was allegedly injured in pit area at defendant corporation's racetrack. The Supreme Court, Kenison, C.J., held that use of word 'person,' in promoters' liability coverage endorsement, was not so vague or ambiguous as to lead a reasonable person in position of insured corporation to the conclusion that coverage included non-participant. In construing the scope of insurance coverage, this court has employed a standard of considering the policy as a whole in view of all the circumstances and as interpreted by a reasonable person in the position of the insured.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1980
Case
Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764 (1980)
Summary
This case stated several important rules. 1. Ambiguities in insurance policies are construed against the carrier and in favor of the insured. 2. In construing the policy, the court must consider the policy as a whole; both clauses (involved in this policy) must be read together. 3. The insurance company has the burden of proof to show that any rider meant to change coverage was approved by the Insurance Department as required by statute in order to be part of the contract. The carrier here failed to carry the burden so the rider in this case was not part of the contract.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1986
Case
Vermont Mutual Insurance Company v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521 (1986)
Summary
Question of whether a homeowner's policy covered acts of sexual assault on a minor. Justice Souter wrote the opinion, which held that there was no coverage. At the least, therefore, an insured's act is not an accidental contributing cause of injury when the insured actually intended to cause the injury that results. [A]n accident is never present when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional unexpected, independent and unforeseen [circumstance exists or] happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. pi *524 Unigard Mut. v. Spokane School Dist., 20 Wash.App. 261,264,579 P.2d 1015, 1018 0978). Nor can an insured's intentional act be an accidental cause of injury when it is so inherently injurious that it cannot be performed without causing the resulting injury.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Declaratory Judgments
Date
1973
Case
Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meehan, 113 N.H. 639 (1973)
Summary
If the insurance company and the insured disagree on their respective rights or obligations under an insurance policy, either party may petition the court for declaratory judgment pursuant to RSA 491:22.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1981/1984
Case
Hull v. Berkshire Mutual, 121 N.H. 230 (1981); McAllister v. Peerless, 124 N.H. 676 (1984)
Summary
The plaintiffs did not allege property damage beyond the improper performance of construction work or the task itself by a construction contractor. In Hull , the plaintiffs discharged a masonry contractor while he was in the process of building a porch, steps and a retaining wall on their property and then sued him for allegedly defective work that he had completed. The court found that the plaintiffs had not alleged property damage covered by the policy because the only basis for their claim was money damages to compensate them for the contractor's defective work. Similarly, in McAllister , the plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract seeking money damages to pay for allegedly defective work by the contractor in installing a leach field. The plaintiff did not allege that the defects had caused damage to any property other than to work product and the damage claim was only defective workmanship. The McAllister court found that the fortuity implied by reference to accident or exposure is not what is commonly meant by a failure of workmanship and ruled that defective work standing alone did not result from an occurrence.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1981
Case
Hull v. Berkshire Mutual, 121 N.H. 230 (1981)
Summary
Property damage is limited to physical injury to tangible property.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Declaratory Judgments
Date
1986/1986
Case
Howard v. Hartford Ins. Co., 127 N.H. 727, 730 (1986)
Summary
An insurer who does not challenge coverage through the declaratory judgment action will not be estopped from denying coverage later.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1994
Case
High Country Assoc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 139 N.H. 39 (1994)
Summary
The court found that damage to condominium units from continuing exposure to moisture seeping through the walls of units met the definition of occurrence in that the negligent construction resulted in the damage rather than occurrence of negligent construction.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Rules of Construction
Date
1993
Case
Green Mt. Ins. Co. v. George, 138 N.H. 10, 14 (1993)
Summary
If the language of the policy reasonably may be interpreted more than one way and one interpretation favors coverage, an ambiguity exists in the policy that will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1994
Case
Green Mountain v. Foreman, 138 N.H. 440 (1994)
Summary
The definition of the term occurrence restricts coverage to injuries caused by accident. The term accident contemplates an undersigned, sudden, and unexpected event. It generally contemplates a single happening, traceable to a definite time, place and cause. The concept generally negates coverage for a deliberately intended act even though the act may have an unexpected result. This is so regardless of attempts at pleading around the limitation by alleging that the physical assault was negligent and that it was not intended to cause the injury sustained.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Declaratory Judgments
Date
1994
Case
Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 138 N.H. 440 (1994)
Summary
Regardless of which party institutes an action for declaratory judgment, the burden to show that coverage does not exist rests upon the insurance carrier pursuant to RSA 491:22-a.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Rules of Construction
Date
2003
Case
Godbout v. Lloyd's Ins. Syndicates, 150 N.H. 103 (2003)
Summary
The specific expectations of the insured are relevant only if there is an ambiguity in the policy or if the party's prior dealings led the insured to form a reasonable belief of coverage.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Bad Faith
Date
1988/1988
Case
Gelinas v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 131 N.H. 154, 162 (1988)
Summary
After reviewing the evidence of the settlement process, the [trial] judge [Dalianis, J.] found that the insurer exercised reasonable care and acted in good faith in its attempts to reach an agreement with {the plaintiff}, further finding that the probability of harm was not sufficiently serious that an ordinary man would avoid it, that [the insurer] was not unduly venturesome at the risk of the insured and that [the insurer's] actions comported with the standard of care that a reasonable man would exercise in the management of his own affairs.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1989
Case
Fisher v. Fitchburg Mutual, 131 N.H. 769 (1989)
Summary
Breach of agreement to sell house does not result in property damage.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Rules of Construction
Date
2001
Case
Energy North Gas, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 146 N.H. 156 (2001)
Summary
An insurance company's obligation to defend its insured is determined by whether the cause of action against the insured alleges sufficient facts in the pleadings to bring it within the express terms of the policy. If no reasonable interpretation of the policy language favors coverage, the court will not create ambiguity just to construe it against the insurer.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Intercompany Disputes
Date
1987
Case
Ellis v. Royal Ins. Co., 129 N.H. 326 (1987)
Summary
While an ambiguous insurance policy will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer, an ambiguous policy provision will not be construed in favor of another insurer.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Bad Faith
Date
1971/1971
Case
Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 111 N.H. 43 (1971)
Summary
The risk of the insurer varies with the coverage available above the settlement opportunity and the weight the insurer must give to the insured's risk increases as the insurer's surplus coverage decreases. When the surplus coverage is substantial, less weight is required to be given to the insured's interests. When the settlement opportunity approaches the limit of coverage, then the insurer's duty may be heavily weighted towards the interests of the insured.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Bad Faith
Date
1947
Case
Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 94 N.H. 484 (1947)
Summary
The Dumas trilogy line of cases established New Hampshire law with respect to the insurer's potential responsibility for verdicts against their insureds in excess of policy limits. The cause of action is not one in strict liability but governed by a negligence standard defined as how a reasonable [person] might act under the same circumstances. The insured's carrier ...was bound to use reasonable care since the carrier had the contractual right to investigate, negotiate and control settlement of the claim.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Rules of Construction
Date
1873
Case
Delancey v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H. 581 (1873)
Summary
In 1873, Chief Justice Doe, in De Lancey v. The Rockingham Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co . case, construed and criticized a property policy issued in 1866 to insure a house, clothing and provisions against loss by fire as one which:

...would not be understood by men in general, even if [the policies were] subjected to a careful and laborious study; by men in general, they were sure not to be studied at all. The study of them was rendered particularly unattractive, by a profuse intermixture of discourses on subjects in which a premium payer would have no interest. The compound, if read by him, would, unless he were an extraordinary man, be an inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of darkness and confusion.... Nevertheless, it was not until the late 1970s that the New Hampshire courts began to unbind themselves from the prevailing view that insurance policies were governed by the same general rules, which are applicable to written contracts generally.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Rules of Construction
Date
1994
Case
Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 138 N.H. 229 (1994)
Summary
In interpreting the language of an insurance policy, the court will take the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy words in context and construe the policy as would a reasonable person in the position of the insured based upon more than a casual reading of the policy as a whole.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Declaratory Judgments
Date
2000
Case
Binda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 144 N.H. 613 (2000)
Summary
The declaratory judgment action determined an insurance company's twin duties to defend and pay a claim made by a third party against its insured, must be brought within six months from the time that the underlying pleading giving rise to the coverage dispute was filed -- unless the insurance carrier did not know about or could not reasonably have discovered the facts giving rise to the coverage dispute within that six month period – or where the failure to file was due to accident, mistake or misfortune. This time limitation served to prevent belated petitions from unfairly impeding the progress of the underlying lawsuit.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Declaratory Judgments
Date
1983
Case
Andrews v. Nationwide Mutual Ins., 124 N.H. 148 (1983)
Summary
Although declaratory judgment actions are a docket clearing mechanism, generally used to determine an insurer's obligation to defend its insured in a third party action, declaratory judgment action may also be used to test the scope or amount of coverage available in a first party claim by the insured against their own insurance carrier. Insurance Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions 1985/1985 Artcraft of NH, Inc. v. Lumberman's Mut. Co., 126 N.H. 844 (1985) Bodily injury does not generally include mental anguish or distress unless it is manifested in physical symptoms reasonably capable of medical diagnosis, such as loss of sleep, weight or appetite. Insurance Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions 1982 Bean v. Miller, 122 N.H. 681 (1982) General liability insurance policies provide coverage for bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence. Bodily injury includes bodily injury, death and loss of services.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1995
Case
ABC Builders v. American Mutual, 139 N.H. 745 (1995)
Summary
Insured built a portion of his dream house over the boundary onto his next door neighbors' property under a mistaken belief as to the location of the boundary line.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Rules of Construction
Date
1978
Case
Storms v. USF&G, 118 N.H. 427 (1978)
Summary
The court expanded upon the reasonable expectations rule, finding that it ...encompasses more than policy language. Even though the record showed that the insured never read his policy, the court found that it was so constructed that a reasonable man in the position of the insured would not attempt to read it and his reasonable expectations will not be limited by the policy language regardless of the clarity of one particular phrase among the Augean stable of print. When such a policy is involved, the insured may rely upon the representations of the agent or even solely upon his own understanding of the insurance he is purchasing so long as that reliance is reasonable.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
2002
Case
Matarese v. New Hampshire Municipal Assoc., 147 N.H. 396 (2002)
Summary
In this case the Court partially overruled its holding in Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. George, 138

N.H. 10. The Court concluded that the term legally entitled to recover in the standard uninsured motorist statute/policy required evidence of fault and required an ability to bring a legal action, thus precluding UIM suits when they were barred by worker's compensation, but not when they are barred by out-of-state law such as Massachusetts PIP laws.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
2004
Case
EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 150 N.H. 828 (2004)
Summary
The New Hampshire Court adopted a continuous trigger theory with regard to long-term progressive environmental contamination damages.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1987
Case
Ellis v. Royal Ins. Co., 129 N.H. 326 (1987)
Summary
The New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted a sliding scale formula to be used in the allocation of a liability credit when more than one uninsured motorist carrier is obligated to contribute to an overall settlement.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1992
Case
Coakley v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 136 N.H. 402 (1992)
Summary
The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that remedial environmental damages fell within the insurance definition of property damages, but injunctive relief and/or damages to prevent future harm did not.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1973
Case
Charest v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 113 N.H. 683 (1973)
Summary
The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the consent to settle clause, if violated, precluded an insured from seeking recovery. The Court distinguished violation of the consent to settle clause from the violation of other policy conditions that require prejudice before resulting in a forfeiture of coverage. This principle was reaffirmed in Stevens v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 135 N.H. 26 (1991).
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1986
Case
Vermont Mutual vs. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521 (1986)
Summary
Where Justice Souter ruled that in a case of an alleged negligent sexual assault, the accident limitation precludes coverage for inherently dangerous acts which are those that cannot be performed without a certainty that some injury will result
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Rules of Construction
Date
1980
Case
Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, (1980)
Summary
The court expanded upon the reasonable expectations rule to adopt the majority position nationally that where policy language is ambiguous or when separate clauses lend themselves to conflicting interpretations, the generally accepted rule of construction is that ambiguous language is construed against the insurer. If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, and the language from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, the terms must be accorded their natural and ordinary meaning. However, when the words of an insurance contract are, without violence susceptible to two interpretations that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss must, in preference be adopted. 120 N.H. at 771.

The court walked back Trombly in Robbins Auto Parts v. Granite State Ins. Co., 121 N.H. 760, 765 (1981), stating that the court will resolve ambiguities in an insurance policy in favor of the insured but:

...will not force an ambiguity in order to resolve it against an insurer. The ambiguity rule which we adopted in Trombly will not be applied to create coverage where it is clear that none is intended. In determining whether an ambiguity exists, we will look to the claimed ambiguity, considerate in appropriate context and construe the words used according to their plain, ordinary and popular definitions.

121 N.H. at 765.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Rules of Construction
Date
1994
Case
Trefethen v. New Hampshire Ins. Group, 138 N.H. 710 (1994)
Summary
Where an insured believes that their insurance policy includes coverage for a specific type of liability based upon their agent's representation, and the insured has not received a written copy of the policy, regardless of the actual written terms of the insurance policy, there may be coverage just as the agent represented.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Declaratory Judgments
Date
1984
Case
The Hartford Ins. Co. v. Bird, 124 N.H. 784 (1984)
Summary
An amended Writ may trigger a new six month limitation period where new factual or legal allegations raise a new coverage issue.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1974
Case
Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New Hampshire- Vermont, 120 N.H. 764 (1974)
Summary
Ambiguities in insurance policies will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Declaratory Judgments
Date
1994
Case
Providence Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 138 N.H. 301 (1994)
Summary
Pursuant to RSA 491:22-b, if an insured prevails in a declaratory judgment action, the insurance company must pay the insured's court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. In the absence of a showing of the insurance company's bad faith however or obstinate, unjust, vexatious, wanton or oppressive conduct, the injured person in the underlying action is not entitled to attorney's fees under Section 22-b.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1994
Case
Providence Mutual v. Scanlon, 138 N.H. 301 (1994)
Summary
Unintended eye injury resulting from shooting a beebe gun at another playmate. Coverage however does extend to even deliberate acts done under a mistaken belief as to a right.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Intercompany Disputes
Date
2004
Case
Peerless Ins. v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 151 N.H. 71 (2004)
Summary
Where two or more insurance companies provide coverage and owe a defense to their insured for a third party's claim and the section of the policies covering conditions regarding other insurance are mutually repugnant, both insurers' provisions are null and void and the insurers provide coverage on a concurrent basis.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Intercompany Disputes
Date
2016
Case
Old Republic Ins. v. Stratford Ins., 168 N.H. 548 (2016)
Summary
If two or more insurance companies provide coverage for a claim against their common insured, the primary carrier has the sole duty to defend until the primary policy limits are exhausted.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
1968
Case
Nassif Realty Corp. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 107 N.H. 267 (1968)
Summary
The court was called upon to construe a policy of fire insurance with extended coverage for windstorm which expressly excluded loss directly or indirectly by ice, snow or sleet whether or not driven by wind. The court found that the policy afforded no coverage for the collapse of the insured building where the wind caused the building to be subjected to a load beyond its bearing capacity. In Nassif , the court said that the windstorm was not the direct and proximate cause of the loss but ...the dominant cause of the loss was a direct or indirect result of snow accumulation.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions
Date
2015
Case
Mellin v. Northern Security Ins. Co., 167 N.H. 544 (2015)
Summary
The insured sought reimbursement for losses to their condominium caused by cat urine odor from two cats kept by their downstairs neighbor which, where the smell entered their unit through an open plumbing chase. The insureds ultimately sold their condominium at a substantial loss in comparison to the sale price of other condominium units in the area which were unaffected by the cat urine odor. The Supreme Court ruled that the insureds were not required to demonstrate a tangible physical alteration to their condominium unit to prove that it was permanently uninhabitable. It said that rather, to demonstrate physical loss ... they must establish a distinct and demonstrable alteration to the unit. The Mellin case will likely be central to the property coverage decisions for business interruption losses allegedly resulting from Covid 19 despite the requirement of underlying physical loss to tangible property caused by the virus.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Bad Faith
Date
1978/1978
Case
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607 (1978)
Summary
Allegations of an insurer's wrongful refusal or delay to settle an insured's first party claim, do not state a cause of action in tort. The insured may however pursue a claim against their own insurance carrier for breach of contract where the damages are not limited to the policy limits plus interest. To limit the insurer's liability would unnecessarily encourage insurers to delay settlement in an attempt to coerce a financially pressured claimant into accepting an unfair settlement because its only liability would be to pay its original obligation and interest. Where the insurer's failure to delay or make prompt payment under the policy is to coerce the insured into accepting less than full performance of the insurer's contractual obligations, there is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in every contract, including insurance contracts. Ibid at p. 612 Insurance Declaratory Judgments 1999 Marcotte v. Timberlane, 143 N.H. 331 (1999) Neither party is required to resolve coverage disputes through the use of a declaratory judgment action. Insurance Interpretation of Substantive Policy Provisions 1984/1984 McAllister v. Peerless, 124 N.H. 676 (1984) Property damage is limited to physical injury to tangible property.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Bad Faith
Date
1982/1982
Case
Jarvis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 N.H. 648 (1982)
Summary
Every party to an insurance contract has an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. If an insured believes that the insurance company failed to settle or pay a claim covered by the insurance policy, the insured may bring a first party claim against the insurance carrier for bad faith breach of the insurance contract. Recovery is not available for emotional distress. Recovery is limited to the policy limits, interest, and any unavoidable consequential damages that the plaintiff can prove which may exceed the amount the insurer would have had to pay in performance of the contract.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1975
Case
Peerless Ins. Co. v. Vigue, 115 N.H. 492 (1975)
Summary
The Court confirmed that any automobile insurance policy provision that conflicts with the coverage mandated by the Financial Responsibility Act is void as a matter of law.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1983
Case
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148 (1983)
Summary
Duty to defend is broader than duty to pay.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1987
Case
Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 130 N.H. 117 (1987)
Summary
Any insured can stand in the shoes of the contracting party to assert various rules regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
2002
Case
Sintros v. Hamon, 148 N.H. 478 (2002)
Summary
Absent a special relationship insurance agent has no duty to affirmatively advise insured of availability or sufficiency of insurance coverage
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1963
Case
Peerless Ins. co. v. Clough, 105 N.H. 76 (1963)
Summary
With respect to occurrence based policies it is the date of the property damage or bodily injury that determines the date of the occurrence rather than the date of the negligent act that causes the subsequent injury.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1974
Case
Magulas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 114 N.H. 704 (1974)
Summary
Court to honor the reasonable expectations of the insured.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
2004
Case
EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 150 N.H. 828 (2004)
Summary
Trigger of coverage, at least in environmental cases is injury-in-fact.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1873
Case
Delancey v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H. 581 (1873)
Summary
Not one of the most important cases but arguably the most entertaining.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1978
Case
Brown v. City of Laconia, 118 N.H. 376 (1978)
Summary
Case is cited for proposition that an injured person has standing to bring a declaratory judgment action against the tortfeasor's insurance company without first obtaining judgment against the insured defendant. That was one of the issues in the case. Unfortunately the decision is not all that clear.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1986
Case
Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 128 N.H. 521 (1986)
Summary
The Court adopted an inherently injurious test for determining whether conduct is accidental under an occurrence-based policy. This two prong test characterizes conduct as intentional if either 1) the insured intends to cause injury through their conduct or 2) the insured's conduct is inherently injurious in that it cannot be conducted without a certainty of causing some damage. This decision, by Justice Souter, was a work around for a decision in McKinnon v. Hanover where the Court concluded an intentional act exclusion did not bar coverage for sexual assault provided the insured testified he or she did not have a subjective intent to cause harm.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
1980
Case
Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764 (1980)
Summary
In this case, the Court adopted a rule of construction that ambiguities in insurance policies will be construed against the carrier. An ambiguity was defined as two reasonable interpretations of the same word or clause.
Subject
Insurance
Sub Subject
Date
2015
Case
Mellin v. Northern Sec. Ins. Co., 167 N.H. 544 (2015)
Summary
The Court held that the pollution exclusion was ambiguous as it applies to cat urine odor as opposed to the traditional environmental loss. The Court in a divided opinion also held that an odor constituted direct tangible physical loss triggering property coverage. This case is being relied upon in today's COVID-19 business interruption coverage cases.
Subject
Land Use/Zoning
Sub Subject
Date
1991
Case
Britton v. Town of Chester, 134 N.H. 434 (1991)
Summary
In a case which stuck a blow against the common practice of exclusionary zoning (the enactment of local land use regulations which create unreasonable barriers to the creation of housing that is affordable to low and moderate income families). Focusing on the very limited land area in which multifamily housing could be developed in the Town of Chester, as well as unreasonable requirements for such developments, the Court ruled that Chester's zoning ordinance was contrary to the general welfare of the community and the region, and therefore violated New Hampshire's zoning enabling act. Moreover, the court ruled that New Hampshire municipalities have an obligation to exercise their land use powers so as to provide reasonable opportunities for the development of housing for low and moderate income families. Finally, the court ruled that a builder's remedy is available after zoning ordinance's restrictions on development are found invalid ... if builder's development is found to be reasonable, i.e., provides realistic opportunity for construction of low and moderate income housing and consistent with sound zoning concepts and environmental concerns 134 N.H. at 444 The ruling was the basis for the enactment of New Hampshire's Workforce Housing Statute, RSA 674:58 et seq.
Subject
Landlord Tenant
Sub Subject
Date
2006
Case
Greelish v. Wood, 154 N.H. 521 (2006)
Summary
The Court ruled that landlords may no longer use self-help to recover possession of residential property, and that even a purchaser of property at a foreclosure sale must use the lawful eviction process to evict the occupants from the premises. Once again, acting to ensure that the law evolves to reflect current day realities the Court noted, The modern trend is founded on the recognition that the potential for violent breach of the peace inheres in any situation where a landlord attempts by his own means to remove a tenant who is claiming possession adversely to the landlord. It furthers important public policies by preventing landlords from taking the law into their own hands, thereby improving the prospects for preserving the public peace. [internal citations omitted] Gree/ish, 154 N.H at 526
Subject
Landlord Tenant
Sub Subject
Date
1998
Case
Havington v. Glover, 143 N.H. 291 (1998)
Summary
In a simple ruling with a major impact on everyday eviction actions, the Court ruled that because RSA Chapter 540 conferred significant benefits on landlords that didn't exist at common law, in order to prevail in a possessory action a landlord must strictly comply with the procedures and requirements set forth in the statute. The court also ruled that any agreement that purports to waiver of those any provisions of the statute are unenforceable.
Subject
Landlord Tenant
Sub Subject
Date
1971
Case
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87 (1971)
Summary
New Hampshire became one of the first states in the nation to abandon the doctrine that a lease of residential property is a conveyance of land in which there are no warranties, and the lessor owes no duty to maintain the safety of the leased premises. Recognizing the enormous change in nature of residential leases from those in effect when the common law developed, the court observed, Nowadays the value to the tenant of his lease of an apartment is not in the land itself, but rather, in the right to enjoy the building thereon as a place in which to live .... The importance of a lease of an apartment today is not to create a tenurial relationship between the parties, but rather, to arrange the leasing of a habitable dwelling. [Citations omitted] Kline, 111 N.H. at 91 On this basis the court ruled, In a written or oral lease of an apartment as a dwelling unit for a specified time or at will there is an implied warranty of habitability by landlord that the apartment is habitable and fit for living, and this means that at the inception of rental there are no latent defects in facilities vital to use of premises for residential purposes and that these essential facil ities will remain during entire term in a condition which makes the property livable. 111 N.H. at 92
Subject
Landlord Tenant
Sub Subject
Date
1973
Case
Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388 (1973)
Summary
Building on its decision in Kline, supra, the Court discarded the rule of caveat lessee in personal injury cases, and ruled that in a tort action for an injury which occurs on rental property: a) Landlords, as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and b) Landlords must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk.
Subject
Landlord Tenant
Sub Subject
Date
1993
Case
Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 137 N.H. 653 (1993)
Summary
In a decision of importance in an increasingly violent society the Court ruled that the implied warranty of habitability, which obligates a landlord to maintain residential property in a safe and habitable condition, does not require landlords to take affirmative measures to provide security against criminal attack. The court noted however that a tenant may recover if landlord has violated express agreement to provide security measures, or has invited such attack through violation of express housing code requirements.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Land Use – Inverse Condemnation
Date
1981
Case
Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590 (1981)
Summary
The planning board denied the landowners' application for subdivision approval of 124 acres in a rural zoning district which permitted residential development. Subsequently the town amended its zoning ordinance so as to rezone most of the 124 acres as part of a conservation district in which essentially all development was prohibited. The Supreme Court agreed with the landowners' claim that the rezoning constituted a regulatory taking, finding that the restrictions substantially deprived them of the economically viable use of their property in order to benefit the public.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Public Purpose Requirement for Local Expenditures – Public Highways
Date
1952
Case
Clapp v. Town of Jaffrey, 97 N.H. 456 (1952)
Summary
Enunciated that public funds must be dispensed for public purposes, and that for public maintenance of a private road or driveway to be constitutionally permissible, the activity must be subordinate and incidental to the needs of the town's own highways and the benefited persons must fully reimburse the town so that no tax monies are spent.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Local Authority – Ultra Vires
Date
1981
Case
Girard v. Town of Allenstown, 121 N.H. 268 (1981)
Summary
Towns only have such powers as are expressly granted to them by the legislature and such as are necessarily implied or incidental thereto, and this does not include enacting a fair rental ordinance. This case reaffirmed that towns and cities are but subdivisions of the State and can only exercise the powers delegated by the Legislature.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Local Authority – Growth Control Ordinances
Date
1978
Case
Beck v. Raymond, 118 N.H. 793 (1978)
Summary
Demonstrated the paramount importance of a comprehensive plan as the basis for valid zoning enactments, requiring the use of solid scientific, and statistical sound conclusions in order to employ the zoning power to manage municipal growth. Using the police power to regulate municipal growth deemed ultra vires.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Conflicts of Interest
Date
1968
Case
Atherton v. Concord, 109 N.H. 164 (1968), overruled in part by Totty v. Grantham Plan. Bd., 120 N.H. 388, 415 A.2d 687 (1980)
Summary
Provided guiding principles on conflicts of interests by local officials, distinguishing conflicts of interest due to direct, personal and pecuniary interests, from public policy opinions that are not disqualifying characteristics of a public official acting in a legislative capacity.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Property Tax Abatement (burden of proof)
Date
2003
Case
Porter v. Town of Sanbornton, 150 N.H. 363 (2003)
Summary
The taxpayer bears the burden in a tax abatement appeal of establishing that the tax assessment results in the taxpayer bearing a disproportionate share of the town's tax burden. The taxpayer challenged the methodology of valuation used by the town in establishing his property tax assessment. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer must show more than that the town's methodology was flawed: a taxpayer must prove that he or she is paying more than he or she ought to pay.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Land Use - Nonconforming Use (expansion
Date
1988
Case
New London Land Use Ass'n v. New London Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 130 N.H. 510 (1988)
Summary
A lawfully established nonconforming land use holds a vested right to continue pursuant to both the NH Constitution and statutes, unrestricted by a subsequently adopted zoning ordinance prohibiting the use. However, the right to expand or change a nonconforming use is limited. The Supreme Court outlined the factors to consider when determining whether a proposed expansion or change is within the scope of the vested right to continue.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Land Use - Subdivisions (off-site extractions as condition of approval)
Date
1977
Case
Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817 (1977)
Summary
The off-site public roads providing access to the developer's property were in need of significant improvement prior to the developer applying for subdivision approval. The planning board denied subdivision approval when the developer refused to agree to a condition of approval that it pay the full cost to upgrade the off-site public roads. The Supreme Court found imposition of the condition would constitute a taking, holding that the subdivider can be compelled 'only to bear that portion of the cost which bears a rational nexus to the needs created by, and [special] benefits conferred upon, the subdivision.'
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Land Use - Subdivisions (vested right to continue)
Date
1980
Case
Henry and Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Allenstown, 120 N.H. 910 (1980)
Summary
A developer may not have completed approved subdivision improvements before a zoning ordinance is amended which prohibits one or more aspects of the improvements. However, the developer may have obtained a vested right to continue under the original subdivision approval without restriction if he has substantially constructed the project or incurred substantial liabilities towards constructing the project. The Supreme Court detailed the factors to consider when determining whether the developer's rights have vested.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Land Use – Equal Protection and Builder's Remedy
Date
2008
Case
Community Resources for Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 157 N.H. 152 (2008)
Summary
The trial court on remand from Community Resources for Justice, Inc. v City of Manchester, 154 NH 748 (2007), found that the city-wide ban on correctional facilities did not meet the newly articulated intermediate scrutiny standard as the city had presented no factual evidence in support of its claimed purpose of the ban and further awarded CRJ a builder's remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed both rulings. The municipality must provide actual evidence that the concerns that gave rise to the restrictions are based on facts, not merely conjecture. The Supreme Court also reiterated the purpose of the builder's remedy: Once an existing ordinance is found to be invalid the Court may provide relief in the form of a declaration that the plaintiff builder's proposed use is reasonable, and the municipality may not interfere with it.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Land Use – Equal Protection
Date
2006
Case
Community Resources for Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748 (2007)
Summary
The building inspector denied CRJ a permit to establish a federal half-way house in Manchester on the ground that the proposed use was a correctional facility not permitted in any zoning district. CRJ's variance application was also denied. CRJ appealed both decisions and also asserted the zoning ordinance as applied violated its federal and state rights to equal protection. The Supreme Court agreed and took the opportunity to enunciate a new test for intermediate scrutiny: The challenged legislation [must] be substantially related to an important governmental objective...To meet [its] burden, the government may not rely upon justifications that are hypothesized or 'invented post hoc in response to litigation,' nor upon 'overbroad generalizations.' The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether the new standard was met.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Right-to-Know Law
Date
1989
Case
Brent v. Paquette, 132 N.H. 415 (1989)
Summary
Permitted local officials to require citizens to make an appointment to see governmental records and made that clear that citizens are not entitled to have access to public records in any quantity at any time a request for access is made. The Right-to- Know Law does not require public officials to retrieve and compile into a list random information gathered from numerous documents if a list of this information does not already exist.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Implied Highway Acceptance
Date
2007
Case
Hersh v. Plonski, 156 N.H. 511 (2007)
Summary
Established that there can be circumstances where municipal conduct could be deemed an implied acceptance of a private road as a public highway, where normally only an express act of acceptance of a dedicated road would create a public road.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Quasi-Judicial Immunity for Land Use Boards
Date
1972
Case
Hurley v. Town of Hudson, 112 N.H. 365 (1972)
Summary
While criticizing municipal sovereign immunity, Chief Justice Kenison recognized the necessity for retaining the protection of governments from liability arising out of decision-making and policy determinations. Thus, a municipal planning board could not be held liable for money damages for approval of a residential subdivision that had an inadequate drainage system.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Abolished Sovereign Immunity for Local Governmen
Date
1974
Case
Merrill v. Manchester, 114 N.H. 722 (1974)
Summary
The court held that municipal immunity for tort liability was abrogated effective July 1, 1975 and that such rule would not apply to torts occurring prior to that date. The court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the city in plaintiffs' negligence actions.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Employment – Incompatibility
Date
1994
Case
Town of Littleton v. Taylor, 138 N.H. 419 (1994)
Summary
Employee of town library is not a town employee for determination of whether statutory incompatibility statute applies. Reaffirms the statutory independence of municipal libraries.
Subject
Municipal Law
Sub Subject
Conflicts of Interest – Prejudgment
Date
1984
Case
Winslow v. Town of Holderness Planning Bd., 125 N.H. 262 (1984)
Summary
Land use board member acting in a quasi-judicial capacity who had prejudged a pending application for subdivision approval was required to recuse from participation on that application. Mere participation in the decision even where the conflicted member's vote did not determine the outcome still required that the decision be vacated and remanded for a new decision.
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Taxation of Charitable Real Estate
Date
1968
Case
Alton Bay Camp Meeting Assn v. Town of Alton, 109 N.H. 44 (1968)
Summary
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Date
2016
Case
Attorney General, Director of Charitable Trusts v. Lereto Publications, Inc., 169 N.H. 68 (2016)
Summary
The probate court ordered a publisher, which had been organized as a nonprofit corporation for the charitable purpose of promoting Roman Catholicism, to submit annual reports as required of charitable organizations under RSA 7:21 and RSA 7:28. On appeal, the court held that the publisher could not avail itself of the exemption from filing annual reports because, indeed, the publisher was not a religious organization. This case establishes that promotion of a religious purpose alone does not enable a charitable organization to claim an exemption from filing annual reports available to actual religious organizations.
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Date
1975
Case
Attorney General v. Rochester Trust Co., 115 N.H. 74 (1975)
Summary
It is well settled that the attorney general is a necessary party in any proceedings involving cy pres, or deviation or termination of charitable trusts. Concord Nat. Bank v. Haverhill, 101 N.H. 416, 145 A.2d 61 (1958); Burtman v. Butman, 94 N.H. 412, 54 A.2d 367 (1947). We hold that the attorney general is not only a necessary party in such cases but may also be the initiating party.
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Date
2007
Case
ElderTrust of Florida, Inc. v. Town of Epsom, 154 N.H. 693 (2007)
Summary
A seminal charitable property tax exemption case, the court held that the plain language of RSA 72:23, V and RSA 72:23-l requires an entity seeking such an exemption to satisfy each of the following four factors; namely, whether: (1) the institution or organization was established and is administered for a charitable purpose; (2) an obligation exists to perform the organization's stated purpose to the public rather than simply to members of the organization; (3) the land, in addition to being owned by the organization, is occupied by it and used directly for the stated charitable purposes; and (4) any of the organization's income or profits are used for any purpose other than the purpose for which the organization was established. Under the fourth factor, the organization's officers or members may not derive any pecuniary profit or benefit.
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Date
2019
Case
In re Trust of Mary Baker Eddy, 172 N.H. 266 (2019)
Summary
While in New Hampshire the N.H. Director of Charitable Trusts (DCT) regulates charitable trusts, which include hospitals, foundations, colleges, and other eleemosynary organizations, on occasion a beneficiary may seek standing to file a court action relating to the administration of the charity. In Mary Baker Eddy , a case of first impression, the court articulated the requirements for such a beneficiary to obtain special interest standing. The court adopted the five factors from Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector ( known as Blasko on Standing) to determine whether a beneficiary is entitled to such special purpose standing. They are: (i) the extent to which the acts complained of are extraordinary and the nature of the relief sought; (ii) the extent to which there is evidence that the charity has acted in bad faith, (iii) the extent to which the DCT has been available and effective in representing the public's interest; (iv) the extent to which the beneficiary has a greater interest in the administration of the charity as compared with potential beneficiaries; and (v) subjective factors and the social desirability of conferring standing.
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Date
2008
Case
Town of Peterborough v. The MacDowell Colony, Inc., 157 N.H. 1 (2008)
Summary
Decided one year after ElderTrust of Florida, Inc. , this important non-profit property tax exemption case analyzed whether an artist-in-residence program was a public charity under RSA 72:23, V. In upholding the Superior Court's order granting the property tax-exemption, the court agreed that in providing certain benefits to artists (free room and board, opportunities for individual work without distraction), the benefits conferred upon the artists were benefits in promotion of the MacDowell Colony's mission, and thus benefited the public as a whole.
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Date
1970
Case
Bricker v. New Hampshire Medical Society, 110 N.H. 469 (1970)
Summary
Judicial interference in the internal affairs of associations is strictly limited and will not be undertaken in the absence of a showing of injustice or illegal action and resulting damage to the complaining member. NH Medical Society is a trade association that received a legislative charter in 1791. This is the origin of the Bricker Doctrine signaling the Court's non- interference into membership based entities. N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases 1958 Concord National Bank v. Haverhill, 101 N.H. 416 (1958) Kenison opinion. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Attorney General, or the Director of Charitable Trusts as his representative (RSA 7:19, 7:20), is an indispensable party in any judicial proceeding involving the enforcement and supervision of charitable trusts. Charitable nonprofit corporations are included. RSA 7:21, II(b). Places the Director in all litigation involving the assets or governance of charitable entities. N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases 1971 Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. Union Lodge, I.O.O.F., 111 N.H. 241 (1971) Kenison opinion upholding obligation of local lodge to obtain consent of central lodge to dispose of property. Delves into the problem of unincorporated associations and when corporate law applies to them. Bylaws of the central lodge controlled. N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases 1990 Horse Pond Fish & Game Club, Inc. v. Cormier, 133 N.H. 648 (1990) Restraints against alienation of real estate are valid if the corporation is a charitable entity; otherwise only reasonable restraints on alienation are permissible. Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to restrictions on alienation of property held by charitable entities. N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases 2019 In re Trust of Mary Baker Eddy, 172 N.H. 266 (2019) Creates a five factor test to determine special interest standing, which limits when potential beneficiaries may sue a charity. While the specific case applies to an express trust, principle should apply to a charitable corporation as well. N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases 1942 Souhegan National Bank v. Kenison, 92 N.H. 117 (1942) A somewhat obscure situation exists in the relation of the State's Attorney–General to charitable trusts. The duty of his office to enforce them admits of no question. The beneficiaries of such trusts are the public or a part of the public, and an individual as a member of the public has rights only as a relator to the Attorney–General. But the office is unorganized an
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Taxation of Charitable Real Estate
Date
1982
Case
Appeal of C.H.R.I.S.T., 122 N.H. 982 (1982)
Summary
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Taxation of Charitable Real Estate
Date
1995
Case
Appeal of Emissaries of Devine Light, 140 N.H. 552 (1995)
Summary
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Taxation of Charitable Real Estate
Date
2001
Case
East Coast Conference v. Town of Swanzey, 146 N.H. 658 (2001)
Summary
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Taxation of Charitable Real Estate
Date
2007
Case
Elderhurst of Florida v. Epsom, 154 N.H. 693 (2007)
Summary
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
General Non-Profit Corporate Law
Date
1966
Case
Nature Conservancy v. Town of Nelson, 107 N.H. 316 (1966)
Summary
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
General Non-Profit Corporate Law
Date
1989
Case
Shakra v. Benedictine Sisters of Bedford, 131 N.H. 417 (1989)
Summary
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Taxation of Charitable Real Estate
Date
1977
Case
St. Paul's School v. Concord, 117 N.H. 243 (1977)
Summary
Subject
N.H. Non-Profit/Charitable Cases
Sub Subject
Taxation of Charitable Real Estate
Date
2008
Case
Town of Peterborough v. McDowell Colony, 157 N.H. 1 (2008)
Summary
Subject
Right To Know
Sub Subject
Date
2020
Case
Marianne Salcetti v. City of Keene, 2020 N.H. LEXIS 106 (2020)
Summary
Subject
Right To Know
Sub Subject
Date
2020
Case
Seacoast Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth, 173 N.H. 325 (2020)
Summary
Subject
Right To Know
Sub Subject
Date
1993
Case
Union Leader Corporation v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624 (1993)
Summary
Subject
Right To Know
Sub Subject
Date
2020
Case
Union Leader Corporation v. Town of Salem, 173 N.H. 345 (2020)
Summary
Subject
Speech/Religion/Assembly/Information
Sub Subject
Date
1983
Case
State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226 (1983)
Summary
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
Misapplying the Proportional Math Concept By Changing the Taxing District
Date
1997
Case
Claremont School District v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462 (1997)
Summary
Holds that the proper taxing district for applying the Constitution's proportional and reasonable test is determined by the purpose of a tax, rather than the entity that controls the mechanics of assessment, collection and disposition of revenues. Holds that, with respect to property taxes used to fund a constitutionally adequate education, the taxing district is the state, not the local government enforcing the tax.

We need look no further to hold that the school tax is disproportionate in violation of our State Constitution. ... In addition, we conclude that the school tax as presently assessed is unreasonable.
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
No Double Taxation of Essentially Identical Income
Date
1981
Case
First Financial Group of New Hampshire, Inc. v. State, 121 N.H. 381 (1981)
Summary
Holds that the New Hampshire Constitution prohibits double taxation of the same business income under the same business tax.

In Concord Inv. Corp. v. N. H. Tax Comm'n, 114 N.H. at 109, 316 A.2d at 195, we stated that when a wholly-owned subsidiary pays a business profits tax and then passes those post-tax profits to its parent in the form of dividends, the parent will not be required to pay a business profits tax on the dividends. This is so not only because RSA 77-A:4 precludes such a result, but, more importantly, because (t)he incidence of the two taxes would be so nearly identical as to result in double taxation of a sort which is not permitted under our Constitution. Concord Inv. Corp. v. N. H. Tax Comm'n, 114 N.H. at 109, 316 A.2d at 195 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 577, 149 A. 321, 330 (1930)).
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
No Flat Minimum Taxes Allowe
Date
1982
Case
Johnson & Porter Realty Co., Inc. v Commissioner, 122 N.H. 696 (1982)
Summary
Holds that the State Constitution prohibits enactment of a flat $250 minimum tax on businesses because it is neither uniform, nor proportional.

Holds that because the statute is void ab initio, the plaintiffs and all other taxpayers similarly situated are entitled to a refund of the tax they paid under that provision, provided that they timely file their demand for reimbursement with the commissioner ...

The minimum tax provided for in RSA 77-A:2-a is a regressive, graduated tax not permitted by our constitution.
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
Uniform, Just and Reasonable Deductions and Exemptions are Allowed
Date
1963
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 105 N.H. 22 (1963)
Summary
Holds that uniform and reasonable exemptions under the interest and dividends tax for (1) a minimum $600 amount, (2) an additional $400 for persons aged 65 and older, and (3) persons who are totally disabled are constitutional.

While any exemption produces a theoretical inequality in the tax burden, it is recognized that the legislative power to tax is usually based on the proposition 'that the equality sought is a practical one.'
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
All Similar Activity Must be Taxed Together
Date
1965
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 106 N.H. 202 (1965)
Summary
Holds that tax on business income must be applied to all enterprises and individuals conducting business, regardless of the form in which they conduct such activities.

Also holds that if corporations are allowed to deduct wages paid to employees and owners, then other forms of business enterprises must be allowed a similar deduction.

We have said that a tax imposed on corporations, while allowing individuals engaged in like businesses or vocations to go free, is unconstitutional. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 138 A. 284. The converse of this is also true. By incorporating his business and drawing a salary, any owner of a business could avoid personal liability for the tax. A small corporation by disbursing its receipts in the payment of salaries and other expenses, could likewise avoid liability for the tax.
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
Materially Different Classes of Property May be Taxed at Different Rates:
Date
1977
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 512 (1977)
Summary
Holds that capital gains are a separate and distinct class of property from interest and dividends and therefore the Legislature may find a rational basis for taxing capital gains at a higher rate. Also holds that the Legislature may create reasonable exemptions such as adjustments, deductions, and credits, on a uniform basis.

It is apparent, therefore, that capital gains are a form of income sufficiently distinguishable from interest and dividends as to justify classifying them separately for purposes of taxation.
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
No Alternative Tax Systems for Similar Activity Allowed
Date
1983
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 296 (1983)
Summary
Holds that the State Constitution prohibits the Legislature from establishing an alternate business profits tax at a different rate than a tax on taxable business profits.

Also, the State Constitution prohibits the Legislature from enacting a tax system that allows a taxpayer to elect one adjustment, for either 20% of a business' gross business income or an unlimited amount attributable to costs of products to be sold.

In our opinion, the statutory classifications of alternate business profits and taxable business profits are essentially classifications of business income. ... The effect of the legislation would be to establish two distinct classes of taxpayers: those who would be required to pay a 1% tax on their alternate business profits, and those who would pay a 8.75% tax on their taxable business profits.
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
No Indirect Graduated Taxes
Date
1989
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 131 N.H. 640 (1989)
Summary
Holds that a proposed $100,000 per employee cap on reasonable compensation deductions violates the proportionality requirement.

The proposed $100,000 cap on reasonable compensation deductions would result in disproportionate taxation and would violate the constitutional principle that the legislature 'must substantially treat all business entities uniformly and equally.'
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
No Graduated Rates
Date
1949
Case
Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 537 (1949)
Summary
Holds that the State Constitution prohibits a graduated rate individual income tax.

The varying rates of taxation upon gross income provided for in House Bill 190 make it conflict with the constitutional requirements in this jurisdiction. The bill results in classification of recipients of gross income for taxation at different rates and so is forbidden.
Subject
Tax Law
Sub Subject
Unlawful and Discriminatory Exemptions May Still Satisfy the State Constitution
Date
1997
Case
Smith v. Department of Revenue Administration, 141 N.H. 681 (1997) (Smith I)
Summary
Examines the exemption from interest and dividends tax of interest and dividend income received from New Hampshire banks under both the federal and state constitutions.

Holds that the exemption of NH bank income does not violate the state constitution because it does not result in nonuniform, disproportionate or unreasonable taxes.

Holds that the exemption unlawfully discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution, but only with respect to taxes imposed on income received from out-of-state banks.

Remands for trial the issue whether, as a matter of fact, the exemption for NH bank income had an actual discriminatory effect with respect to other out-of-state sources of investment income that were subject to the interest and dividends tax.

In fashioning a remedy, however, the trial court must determine whether the petitioners can prove their claim that the effect of the exemptions for New Hampshire bank interest and dividends was to discriminate unlawfully against other sources of interest and dividend income, as opposed to discriminating solely against income earned on investments in out-of-state banks, as the State maintains.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Eradication of the Pure Accident Jury Instruction
Date
1985
Case
Dyer v. Herb Prout & Co., 126 N.H. 763 (1985)
Summary
In Dyer, the Supreme Court moved beyond earlier cautions or admonitions on the evils or risks of the ancient pure or unavoidable accident instruction and declared enough is enough. It was found to be error for the trial court here to give such an instruction. The rationale was based on the prejudice to the plaintiff, the confusion or superfluity of the charge, and the suggestion that it projects that this is a separate ground of non-liability for a defendant. Amazingly, this issue still comes up in charging conferences, sometime with this relic's cousin – the mere error in judgment charge.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Limitation of Actions – Constitutional Protection
Date
1980
Case
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 926 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Cmty. Res. for Just., Inc. v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748 (2007)
Summary
This case adjudicated challenges by a group of plaintiffs of so-called tort reform provisions in a NH statute limiting medical negligence claims against providers, and providing a cap on non-economic losses at $250,000. The enactment was in response to an alleged crisis in medical care and the insurance market. A collection of notice requirements, reductions in the statute of limitations, periodic payments of judgments for future damage over $50,000, and a limitation on attorneys' contingent fees were included in this alleged reform statute. The case presented a frontal assault on the assumptions, differing treatment, and purpose of the statute, arguing it violated core principles under the Federal and State Constitutions. The court weighed each of the discriminatory provisions applicable to medical negligence actions, striking most of the statutory provisions down as being in clear violation of the Constitutions. The case is notable in the reliance on provisions of the State Constitution, establishing that the scope and protections are broader than the interpretation of the Federal Constitution. Ultimately, the court voided the entire enactment, even though certain provisions might have independently passed judicial muster.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Libel and Slander – General Principles
Date
1961
Case
Chagnon v. Union Leader Corp., 103 N.H. 426 (1961)
Summary
The Chagnon case arose out of the publication of a series of articles critical of the conduct of the owner of a garden supply store providing nursery stock for a municipal project. The case interprets a wide variety of principles bearing on libel or slander claims, and the evidentiary requirements to maintain the claim. The opinion clarifies the handling of claims of actual malice. It stands as a foundation for the later development of the law of defamation.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress – Bystander Claims
Date
1979
Case
Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647 (1979)
Summary
In Corso, the court reversed prior authority barring claims for emotional distress by parental bystanders arising from serious injuries to their child or other loved ones. After examining the jurisprudence in other states and legal commentators, the court permitted certain claims to be brought. In drafting the limitations of the new rule, the court limits such an action under principles of foreseeability to parents who contemporaneously and sensorially perceive a serious injury to their child and suffer serious mental and emotional harm. The court also required the distress be accompanied by objective physical symptoms. In subsequent decisions, the scope of this claim has included loved ones beyond the parent/child relationship.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Apportionment of Fault
Date
2006
Case
DeBenedetto v. CLD Consulting Engineers, Inc., 153 N.H. 793 (2006)
Summary
In DeBenedetto, the court interpreted the statutory provisions governing joint and several liability among tortfeasors, holding that the apportionment of damages to a party at fault includes not only the parties to the legal action, but also settling parties and any persons or entities that contributed to the occurrence giving rise to an action. This holding has been applied to immune parties or those against whom an action may not be legally brought. A series of subsequent cases have further defined the application of this doctrine and have had a profound impact on civil litigation and the trial of such cases.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Arguing a Per Diem or Formula to a Jury
Date
1962
Case
Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182 (1962)
Summary
This case established or perpetuated the rule prohibiting the use of formulas, precise units of time, or other mathematical calculations in arguing damages. Plaintiff's counsel broke down life expectancy of the plaintiff into 233,600 hours and tried to argue $134,000 of pain and suffering on a per diem calculation. The court rejected this approach, but left undisturbed the practice permitting counsel to argue a lump sum or the ad damnum value set forth [but no longer] in the writ. It is notable that trial courts across the country still vary enormously in the permissible limits of quantifying damages to a jury.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
The Sudden Emergency and Instinctive Actions Defense
Date
1985
Case
Gagnon v. Crane, 126 N.H. 781 (1985)
Summary
July 24, 1985 saw the court release its opinion in Dyer, eradicating the pure accident charge, and then its decision in Gagnon, which reversed the defendant's verdict, which had followed very pro-defendant instructions on the sudden emergency doctrine, the instinctive action doctrine and the unavoidable accident rule. A hat trick of judicial analysis seeking to eliminate instructions which had drawn criticism for generations. In dealing with the sudden emergency and instinctive action doctrines, the problem was not in the concept – truly instinctive responses, without any time for thought, may be a credible defense. And an actor faced with a sudden emergency may have his or her conduct judged in the light of the short time interval for reaction. The problem is that the sudden emergency should not be a separate defense – that fact is incorporated into the general negligence instruction. The court then reviewed the evidence, finding defendant rear-ended the plaintiff, who was stopped, with brake lights on. The court's opinion is helpful in understanding the doctrines and their limits.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Date
1978
Case
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607 (1978)
Summary
Insurer Bad Faith Damages Based on Contract
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Date
1970
Case
Wentworth Hotel v. F. A. Gray, Inc., 110 N.H. 458 (1970)
Summary
Implied Covenant of Workmanship
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Date
1973
Case
Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388 (1973)
Summary
Landlord Liability Revised
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Date
1976
Case
Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552 (1976)
Summary
Landlord Liability Revised
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Date
1966
Case
Clark v, Clark, 107 N.H. 351 (1966)
Summary
Choice of Law
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Date
1989
Case
Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 132 N.H. 133 (1989)
Summary
Implied Covenant of Good Faith in All Contracts
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Strict Liability in Tort – Failure to Warn
Date
1978
Case
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802 (1978)
Summary
The NH Supreme Court in Thibault expanded on its earlier products liability rulings and set forth a comprehensive foundation for strict liability claims, especially the failure to warn. This claim arose from a lawn mower accident with liability resting on the design of the machine and the inadequacy of warnings. The court discussed the law of strict liability with the elements of the causes of action and defenses arising out of the facts of the case. Thibault is a watershed of authority for the many products liability claims that have followed and built upon this decision.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Loss of Enjoyment of Life – Hedonic Damages
Date
2017
Case
Stachulski v. Apple New England, LLC, 171 N.H. 158 (2018)
Summary
In Stachulski, the court extended the scope of recoverable damages to a plaintiff for the lost ability to engage in activities that once brought pleasure (loss of enjoyment of life). In prior holdings, the court had ruled such hedonic damages were recoverable where the plaintiff suffered a permanent loss. In this case, the court held there is no basis to distinguish a temporary loss of such pleasurable activities from a permanent loss. As a result, injuries that deprive the plaintiff from the loss of the enjoyment of engaging in such activities on either a permanent or temporary basis will be recoverable.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Negligence Per Se Doctrine – Statutory Duty
Date
1995
Case
Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708 (1995)
Summary
The Marquay case solidified the role of a statute defining a duty of care, as it relates or expands upon the reasonable person standards which exist at common law. In Marquay and later cases, the court has held that where an action existed at common law, the negligence per se doctrine may define the standard of care as set forth in a particular statute, instead of applying the reasonable person standard.
Subject
Tort
Sub Subject
Assumption of a Known Risk
Date
2002
Case
Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407 (2002)
Summary
A person who expressly releases a defendant from liability for negligent acts may be barred from recovery by this express assumption of the risk. However, a plaintiff that knows of danger presented by a defendant's negligence and voluntarily encounters it, is not necessarily barred from the action. The plaintiff's knowledge and actions in voluntarily encountering the danger, are evidence to be considered on the issue of plaintiff's comparative fault.
Subject
Trust & Estates
Sub Subject
Date
2017
Case
Hodges v. Johnson, 170 N.H. 470 (2017)
Summary
Trust beneficiaries succeeded in a superior court action to declare two previous trust decantings void which removed their beneficial interest in the trust and to remove the trustees for a serious breach of trust, to which the Trustees appealed. The Court held that when conducting a decanting, a Trustee must take into consideration all beneficiary's interests and the terms of the trust to determine whether decanting would be a breach of the duty of impartiality. The statutory duty of impartiality requires a Trustee to treat the beneficiaries equitabily in light of the purposes and terms of the trust. The Trustees must consider all beneficiary's interests regardless of whether they are vested or future interests. Additionally, the Court examined RSA 564-B:7-706(b) to upheld the stautory language enumerating the authority of a court to remove a trustee for cause.
Subject
Trust & Estates
Sub Subject
Date
2013
Case
Shelton v. Tamposi, 164 N.H. 490 (2013)
Summary
At issue here is whether a trustee has standing to contest a trial court's ruling that litigation brought both by a beneficiary in her official capacity as trustee and as a beneficiary violates an in terrorem clause of a trust instrument. The Court held that under the New Hampshire Uniform Trust Code, a trustee does not have standing to challenge a ruling that an in terrorem clause was violated because they have a duty to administer the trust in a manner that is impartial with respect to the various beneficiaries and their interests created by the terms of the trust. A beneficiary, however, will have standing given that he or she will suffer a loss of a legal right as a result of an in terrorem ruling.
Subject
Trust & Estates
Sub Subject
Date
2019
Case
In re Estate of Anthony Mesiti, 2019 WL 963237 (2019)
Summary
The Court upheld an interlocutory appeal analyzing whether an heir-at-law, with no beneficial interest in a will, may challenge the wills validity. The Court held that an heir- at-law may challenge a will's validity even if previous wills may be revived. The Court reasoned that if the beneficiary was successful, intestate succession will direct distributions to the beneficiary and thereby make the heir-at-law an interested party. The Court further addressed that the previous wills have not yet been proved or allowed. Therefore, if the beneficiary is successful, intestate succession will direct distributions until each subsequent will is proved and allowed.
Subject
Trust & Estates
Sub Subject
Date
1992
Case
In re Estate of Ríchard S. Rolfe, 136 N.H. 294 (1992)
Summary
Beneficiaries under a Will appealed an award of $26,000 for executor's and attorney's fees calculated on the basis of the probate court fee guidelines which were not adopted or approved by the New Hampshire Supreme Court (Court). Without ruling on the legality of the guidelines, the Court expressly disapproved of their use for establishing the reasonableness of executor's and attorney's fees in estate cases. Rather, the Court held that the probate court should determine the reasonable fees of an executor by examining the complexity of the estate and the responsibilities of the executor in light of the services rendered with the amount being dependent upon the labor, risk, responsibility and trouble of each particular case. With respect to attorney's fees, the Court held that the reasonableness of attorney's fees is determined by the probate court on an examination of a variety of factors, including those identified in Rule l.S(a) of the New Hampshire Code of Professional Responsibility. The non-exclusive list of factors includes the follow factors: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involves, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fees customarily charged in the locality for similar services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer(s) performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; and (9) any other relevant circumstances.
Subject
Trust & Estates
Sub Subject
Date
2018
Case
In re Teresa E. Craig Living Trust, 171 N.H. 281 (2018)
Summary
The Court analyzed whether a settler's heir-at-law can raise a pretermitted heir claim under RSA 551:10 against a Trust. The Court held that the pretermitted heir statute is a rule of law and not a rule of construction and therefore not applicable to the New Hampshire Uniform Trust Code under RSA 564-B:1-112. While this case was pending, the legislature amended RSA 564-B:1-112 to explicitly state that RSA 551:10 is not applicable to the New Hampshire Trust Code. The Court further reasoned, without ruling on whether the statute should be applied retroactively, that the Legislature is deemed to know the common law and they explicitly failed to expand the RSA 551:10 to apply to trusts.
Subject
Trust & Estates
Sub Subject
Date
2001
Case
Scheffel v. Krueger, 146 N.H. 669 (2001)
Summary
A tort creditor sought to attach a beneficiary's trust interest which was dismissed by the superior court due to a spendthrift provision. On appeal the Court held that: (1) the trust's spendthrift provision barred the attachment to satisfy a tort creditor, and (2) the spendthrift provision is valid even if a beneficiary can exert significant control over the trust. The Court reasoned that, under the statute, a spendthrift provision is enforceable unless the beneficiary is also the settlor or the assets are fraudulently transferred to the trust. In addition, the Court reasoned that although the beneficiary receives annual income distributions and will be eligible to demand principal at a later date, the spendthrift provision remains valid because it does not violate the statutory exceptions of the beneficiary being the settlor or fraudulent transfers.